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DISASTERS AND DISCLOSURES 
  Donald C. Langevoort* 
 
Corporate disasters happen with unnerving frequency.  These can be 
visibly dramatic events like fires, explosions, or toxic leakage that cause 
physical and economic harm both inside and outside the firm.  The BP 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig catastrophe is a prime example, with loss of 
life, environmental damage across a multi-state expanse, and great 
consequential economic loss.1 Many are legal compliance disasters: a 
massive fine or penalty imposed on the company after government 
authorities determine that the corporation surreptitiously had violated the 
law. Others may be on a smaller scale yet still painful, as with a defective 
product on which the company had pinned its hopes, or the departure of a 
key leader under questionable circumstances.  
High-profile bad news events like these almost always produce high-
stakes litigation.2  Victims and their champions surface before, during, 
and after the damaging event becomes public. And if the company was 
publicly-traded, almost surely among these will be investors who own or 
owned the firm’s securities. A defining characteristic of these kinds of 
                                                 
*  Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  My thanks to 
Hillary Sale for helpful comments, and to Crystal Weeks, Dominique Rioux, Andrew Ko and Andrew 
Hopkins for excellent research assistance. 
1 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT—DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, Jan. 2011, available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-ILCOMMISSION.pdf; Russell Mills & Christopher Koliba, The 
Challenge of Accountability in Complex Regulatory Networks: The Case of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 9 
Reg. & Gov. 77 (2015).   
2  Indeed, there is an elite legal practice specialty in representing the “corporation in crisis” that includes 
managing and helping resolve fast-spreading legal risk across multiple domains (federal and state, public 
and private.  This is part of a larger enterprise risk in the event of a crisis, with reputational 
consequences that in turn affect the severity of the legal risk—the inevitable consequences of 
“publicness.”  See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 Brook. L. 
Rev. 1629 (2014).  On the connection between publicness and shareholder litigation, see Hillary A. 
Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness and Securities Class Actions, 93 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 487 (2015); on the interaction of reputation, crisis and share prices, see Jiuchang Wei et al., Well 
Known or Well Liked? The Effects of Corporate Reputation on Firm Value at the Onset of a Corporate Crisis, 38 





corporate disasters is that when news of the event becomes public, the 
company’s stock price drops immediately and sharply, often “erasing” 
billions of dollars in market capitalization. Investors naturally feel 
damaged and want compensation.  The most potent post-disaster remedy 
involving publicly-traded issuers is usually a federal class action under 
either Section 11 of the Securities Act of 19333 or the “fraud-on-the-
market” theory for an implied private right of action under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The latter is 
more common, and thus the main subject of attention here.   
A fraud-on-the-market lawsuit allows for recovery of damages on 
behalf of investors who bought or sold publicly-traded securities in an 
efficient marketplace at a price distorted by fraud on the part of the issuer 
or its management.4 To recover in the aftermath of a corporate disaster,5  
purchaser-plaintiffs have to satisfy three main burdens of proof on the 
merits (while facing a multitude of potential defenses).  One is to 
establish deception—one or more corporate statements that were 
materially false or misleading when made, which plausibly distorted the 
stock price to the investors’ detriment.  In disaster cases, these are usually 
claims that the company hid the risk of occurrence in the months, weeks 
or days before the blow-up.  The next is to establish scienter, i.e., that 
these statements were intentionally false or made recklessly.6  Last is a set 
of showings related to causation, which involves connecting investor 
purchases class-wide to both the prior distortion and a subsequent loss in 
value of the stock after some corrective disclosure was made revealing the 
truth.7   
                                                 
3 Section 11 creates an express remedy for misrepresentations and omissions in registration statements 
filed in the course of a registered public offering.  E.g., Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council 
Pension Fund, 135 S.Ct. 1318 (2015)(Section 11 suit involving a substantial compliance 
disaster)(“Omnicare”).  Public offerings are at best episodic in the corporate lifecycle and hence these 
cases are relatively less common than 10b-5 cases even though the ’33 Act cause of action is more 
plaintiff-friendly.   
4  See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S.Ct. 2398 (2014)(“Halliburton II”).  The underlying 
idea is that fraud in such markets harms all traders who assumed that the price was honestly and fairly 
set.   
5 I make no effort to define “disaster,” and indeed that word often is used loosely to describe any bad 
news serious enough to lower a company’s stock price.   
6 See Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007)(applying heightened pleading 
standard for scienter). 
7 See Halliburton II, supra (presumption of reliance for all traders who relied on market integrity); Dura 





Disaster-related fraud-on-the-market lawsuits can be controversial for 
any number of reasons.  There may be doubts about the propriety of 
letting investors seek compensation alongside those more directly—
sometimes horrifically—injured by the disaster, because shareholders 
may have been the intended beneficiaries of the risky business while the 
other victims were simply put in harm’s way.  As in most all securities 
class actions, moreover, the main defendant is usually the corporation 
itself rather than individual wrongdoers, so that amounts paid in 
settlement or judgment (putting aside insurance) come out of the pockets 
of all current shareholders,8 even though they too are victims of the 
catastrophe. The class of plaintiffs seeking recovery under Rule 10b-5 is 
limited to those who can demonstrate that they purchased their shares 
after the deception began.  Hence the feverish effort by the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to identify false or misleading statements tied to the disaster as far 
back in time as possible, to maximize the size of the class and resulting 
recovery. Shareholders who bought afterwards have some chance of 
recovery.  Shareholders who bought before are just double losers, 
suffering the share value loss from the disaster itself and from the 
additional costs associated with the litigation in which subsequent 
purchasers receive compensation.9  
Legal scholars have generated an abundant literature examining each of 
the individual elements of the cause of action (and sub-elements, 
affirmative defenses, etc.) in an effort both to assess the soundness of 
prevailing doctrine and contribute to the on-going debate over whether 
such cases have positive net social value in terms of the compensation they 
offer or the deterrence they provide.10 Less attention, however, has been 
given to how all the different pieces mesh together.   
                                                                                                                              
the use of the class action device by demonstrating that common issues predominate, which is the 
primary function of the reliance presumption. 
8  See William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 69 (2011). 
9  See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1421 
(1994). 
10 Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its 
Implications, 106 Colum. L. Rev.  1534 (2006) with James Spindler, We Have a Consensus on Fraud on the 
Market: But It’s Wrong, 7 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 67 (2017); see also James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, 
Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the 





Disaster cases are mostly about distortions via the alleged concealment 
of risk factors prior to the crisis. In an ideal world, serious risk factors 
would naturally be subject to a duty to disclose, with scienter and 
materiality the only hard questions—there is no social value to justify 
deliberate concealment once those thresholds are met.  Yet for a host of 
doctrinal, pragmatic and political reasons, there is no such duty.  The SEC 
has imposed a set of requirements that sometimes forces risk disclosure, but 
does so neither consistently nor adequately, and with uneven 
enforcement.  Courts in 10b-5 cases, in turn, have made duty mainly a 
matter of active rather than passive concealment and thus, literally, 
wordplay: there is no antifraud-based duty to disclose risks unless and 
until the issuer has said enough to put the particular kind of risk “in 
play.”11  But when that is, and why, flummoxes them.  
A particularly striking example can be found in the litigation following 
what is said to be Brazil’s worst environmental disaster, the collapse of 
the Fundao dam in November 2015.  The dam (holding back toxic sludge 
from mining operations) was owned by a joint venture co-owned by two 
global companies with mines nearby, Vale and BHP Billiton.  Both 
companies had securities traded in the U.S., and hence 10b-5 lawsuits 
were filed separately against each in the Southern District of New York 
for making statements touting their commitment to the safety of their 
projects while not revealing facts allegedly known to both indicating that 
Fundao was at risk.  The public statements each made with respect to the 
respective companies’ commitment to safety and the environment were 
comparably soft and filled with marble-mouthed generalities. (Vale: “[w]e 
are striving to build a company of solid values,” including “respect [for] 
the environment and genuine care for the safety and well-being of fellow 
colleagues and respect for the communities in which our company 
operates,” and “we seek nothing less than zero harm”; BHP Billiton: “[t]he 
health and safety of our people must come first and so across BHP Billiton 
we’ve interacted with the whole workforce to reaffirm our commitment 
to their safety and well-being, and to insist any work that is unsafe must 
be stopped.”)  Yet the reactions of the two district judges, ruling just a 
few months apart, were palpably inconsistent on whether these 
                                                 
11  For a relatively early expression of this, see In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 640 (3d Cir. 
1989)(duty to disclose unlawful marketing practice in light of affirmative statements touting marketing 
prowess). For more, see J. ROBERT BROWN JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE sec. 





statements could mislead the reasonable investor.  No said the judge in 
the Vale case, because the touting was ordinary puffery with no solid 
communicative content;12 yes the judge said as to BHP because, while the 
touting statements might indeed be general, they were nonetheless made 
in a way that stressed the importance of mine safety “over and over and 
over,” suggesting that the company knew that reasonable investors cared 
about these risks and allowing the inference that it was trying to deceive 
them.13  So who was right, and why? This incoherence could be 
rationalized by a more thoughtful assessment of how words matter to 
investors and better appreciation of the variable role that managerial 
credibility plays in the process of disclosure and interpretation, which are 
the two main contributions in what follows.14 But even if there is more 
thoughtfulness to the endeavor, it is fair to ask why wordplay should 
make so much of a difference as to duty in the first place, or whether 
instead our impoverished conception of duty deserves a more thorough 
makeover.   
There are many pay-offs from this kind of inquiry, both academic and 
practical.  By looking closely at alleged falsity over the course of a disaster 
timeline, we get a good glimpse of how disclosure works in real time, as 
corporate executives and the company’s lawyers craft strategic responses 
to the line-item disclosure obligations that the SEC imposes15 and 
negotiate the murky world of voluntary disclosure—whether and what to 
say in response to marketplace pressures (from the analysts, institutional 
investors, the media and other vocal stakeholders) to reveal more than the 
SEC forces about the risks the company faces. Research in financial 
economics is paying more attention to these complex interactions—
essentially, the micro-structure of corporate communications—which are 
far more complicated than suggested by the simplifying assumptions about 
                                                 
12 In re Vale S.A. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 99,658 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).  The court did, 
however, allow the case to go forward with respect to separate allegations that Vale misled investors as 
to the mitigation plans and procedures in place and in certain post-accident public statements. 
13 In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 3822755 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) at *10.  In footnote 3, the 
court distinguished the alleged misrepresentations in Vale as “significantly more specific” than the ones 
before it, but that is very hard to see much of a distinction from a side-by-side comparison of the 
disclosures in question.   
14 For an effort along these same lines so as to enhance the potency of disclosure and corporate 
governance, see Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 91 (2017). 
15 See Zahn Bozanic, Securities Law Expertise and Corporate Disclosure, Oct. 2016, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2662096 (evidence that elite securities lawyers 





near-perfect market efficiency that once dominated. Courts are a step 
behind, while lawyers seem to have found the doctrinal soft spots and 
how to exploit them.  Language matters, presenting opportunities for 
obfuscation and gamesmanship.   
In terms of fraud-on-the-market liability exposure, disasters are an 
ideal (if disturbing) setting for thinking through the background norms of 
corporate discourse—the implicit rules of interpretation for how 
marketplace actors interpret what issuers say and don’t say, whether in 
formal SEC disclosures, conference calls, press conferences and even 
executive tweets.16 They also offer a distinctive point of reference for 
thinking about contemporary controversies associated with bringing 
matters of social responsibility (e.g., law abidingness) and sustainability 
(environmental compliance, cybersecurity, product safety, etc.) into the 
realm of securities law.17  Especially as more and more attention is paid to 
the environmental, regulatory and social risks corporations face, with 
fears of so many potential disasters in their future, this subject will surely 
grow in both interest and importance. 
To this end, Part I explores the duty to disclose disaster-related risks, 
separating between two main sources of disclosure obligations in the run-
up to catastrophe: those created by the SEC, and those imposed by the 
courts mainly via the half-truth doctrine, from which comes so much of 
the gamesmanship.  Part II then examines the especially problematic duty 
questions that arise when what is concealed was at the time under 
investigation from regulators or prosecutors, or was concealed unlawful 
behavior.  Part III turns to duty once the crisis has become public, when 
the issuer has to narrate the disaster as it unfolds.  Then we turn to ways 
in which duty affects other elements of the fraud cause of action as applied 
to corporate disasters.  Part IV considers the connections between duty 
and scienter; Part V does the same with respect to causation and damages.  
Part VI applies the foregoing to the burgeoning subject of sustainability 
disclosure, and Part VII concludes. 
 
                                                 
16 See Gregory S. Miller & Douglas J. Skinner, The Evolving Disclosure Landscape: How Changes in 
Technology, the Media and Capital Markets Are Affecting Disclosure, 53 J. Acct. Res. 221 (2015). 
17 See generally Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 





I.  DISASTERS AND DECEPTION 
 
 A.  The Centrality of Duty 
 
The law at work in determining whether there was deception in the 
course of some corporate disaster and if so when it began derives from a 
fundamental question: does (or should) the issuer have a duty to reveal 
material inside information that indicates that the disaster is looming, if 
not already in progress?   In principle, at least, it is hard to see in theory 
why not, assuming that we wish for stock prices to be as accurate as 
possible.18 This category of information is not the sort that we privilege 
from disclosure in the interest of encouraging production and 
innovation—the main reason for truncating disclosure duties.19  To be 
sure, the issuer that makes such disclosure will suffer (and hence its 
shareholders will, too), but the benefit of candor to the market at large 
coupled with the socially beneficial externalities in the allocation of 
capital, better corporate governance and otherwise, trumps that 
particular self-interest in hiding bad news. 
That is not to deny that there are real costs to take account of when 
mandating this kind of risk disclosure.  These include the cost of 
collecting information and weeding out the immaterial risks from the 
material ones, and the concern that speculative disclosure may be 
misinterpreted and lead to over-reaction by investors and other 
stakeholders.  More subtly, there is often fear of the self-fulfilling 
prophecy: that disclosure of a possibility (e.g., a threatened government 
lawsuit) by itself makes the disaster more likely or weakens the 
company’s ability to prevent it.  All this is part of the balancing the SEC is 
supposed to do.  This article is not the place to attempt a cost-benefit 
analysis or formulate ideal disclosure policy for disaster-related risks 
generally, though we will certainly look more closely at the challenges 
that arise over the course of the disaster timeline.  My sense, for what it is 
worth, is that the SEC has fallen short of the optimal in its policies 
                                                 
18 E.g., Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 Wisc. 
L. Rev. 297; Thompson & Sale, supra, at 530-31. 





relating to risk disclosure,20 and that this failing has had an unfortunately 
spillover effect on fraud litigation.  
The courts play a backup role here, with a more limited mandate of 
imposing disclosure duties only to the extent that nondisclosure 
constitutes fraud. As courts have formulated Rule 10b-5’s “duty to 
disclose,” the concealed truth must be of course be material, i.e., of 
importance to a reasonable investor.21  But that is only the starting point, 
much as many plaintiffs and their lawyers wish otherwise.  There is no 
liability simply because investors would consider the secret important and 
like to know it.22  There must also be a duty to speak.  While there are a 
number of duty theories, by far the most important is the half-truth 
doctrine—once the issuer speaks, it must tell both the literal truth and 
the whole truth, not omitting any hidden facts necessary to make what is 
said not misleading.23  This potent textual coupling is found in the text of 
the most important express antifraud provisions under the securities laws, 
as well as in Rule 10b-5.  In its recent Omnicare decision,24 the Supreme 
Court had something to say about finding half-truths in statements of 
opinion (there in the context of a compliance failure), which is relevant to 
all disaster cases.25   
                                                 
20 See Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75 
Wash. U.L.Q. 753 (1997). 
21 These same challenges arise in the assessment of materiality. See Matrixx Initiatives Inc. v. 
Siricusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011).  Though usually treated as a stand-alone requirement, the materiality 
determination is really just a part of assessing whether a misstatement or omission was deceptive.   
22 In other words, materiality does not itself create a duty.  This step was not obvious as a matter of law 
until the early 1980s, when it emerged out of dicta in two Supreme Court rulings: Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), an insider trading case, and Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 n. 17 
(1988), a materiality decision. As a result of the indirect way the law of duty formed, there is no 
overarching theory, which has led to a very “muddled” body of precedent.  See Donald C. Langevoort 
& G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1639 (2004).  On 
the duty to disclose prior to those two Supreme Court decisions, see Jeffrey Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the 
Corporation’s Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 Geo. L.J. 935 (1979). 
23 As courts often point out, this is not actually a disclosure obligation since the fraud is in what was 
said, not what was not said.  Nonetheless it operates as such if the only way to speak truthfully would 
be to reveal the hidden fact.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by 
Investors and Others, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87 (1999). The other forms of duty include fiduciary obligation, 
and the duties to update and correct. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 722-26 (8th ed. 2017); note -- infra.  Though these could be raised in disaster cases, they 
tend not to be.   
24  Omnicare was a Section 11 case brought pursuant to the Securities Act (see note --- supra) but most 
courts since have applied its reasoning to fraud-on-the-market litigation under Rule 10b-5 as well.   
25  Hillary Sale and I have recently explored both the discourse and corporate governance implications 





The half-truth doctrine forces judges to assess claim of hidden risks by 
reference to whether what was undisclosed rendered what was said 
incomplete, thereby crossing the dividing line from passive to active 
concealment. In the Deepwater Horizon securities lawsuit, for example, 
the main pre-explosion storyline put forth by plaintiffs was that BP was 
stressing enhanced safety measures that were put in place after a previous 
oil spill disaster, while failing to reveal the extent to which rigs not 
directly owned by BP, like Deepwater, were not subjected to the same 
procedures.26 In the Fundao dam cases, the touting allegedly covered up 
private warnings over a series of years from contractors, inspectors and 
licensing authorities questioning the stability of the dam.27  Any careful 
reader of judicial decisions in this area involving defendants’ pre-trial 
motions to dismiss will note how much time is spent going one by one 
through plaintiffs’ often lengthy list of claimed misrepresentations and 
omissions to determine whether a reasonable investor would really have 
been misled by them, assuming plaintiff’s claims about hidden risks are 
otherwise true.   
This task is taken on by judges with surprising confidence, even though 
that question is really quite difficult given how many different kinds of 
investors interact in our financial markets and the varying mixes of 
information to which they have access.28  These seem like mixed 
questions of law and fact of the sort commonly left to fact-finders at trial, 
which is exactly what the plaintiffs’ attorneys want to have happen.29  And 
indeed that is what judges do say when rejecting motions to dismiss.  Yet 
                                                                                                                              
Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 Duke L.J. 763 (2016); see also 
James D. Cox, “We’re Cool” Statements after Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits for Failure to Comply with the 
Law, 68 SMU L. Rev. 715 (2015). 
26 See In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 922 F. Supp.2d 600 (S.D. Tex. 2013).  There were also post-
explosion disclosure issues, discussed infra.  A prior BP disaster also triggered high-profile shareholder 
litigation and was the background for the subsequent Deepwater claims.  See Reese v. Malone, 747 
F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2014). 
27  See pp. ---- supra.   
28  For just a sampling of this literature, see David Hoffman, The “Duty” to be a Rational Shareholder, 90 
Minn. L. Rev. 537 (2006); Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. Rev. 461 (2015); Charles 
Korsmo, The Audience for Corporate Disclosure, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1581 (2017).  Some courts describe this 
as a materiality inquiry, but that isn’t right.  The question is not whether a reasonable investor would 
consider the statement important on its face but rather whether the reasonable investor would be 
misled by the omission of what is a material fact.  See note --- supra.   
29 It is well understood in both the case law and academic commentary that fraud-on-the-market trials 
almost never occur, because the high-stakes case will be settled beforehand.  Hence the stepped up pre-
trial judicial role on these fact-like questions mainly helps determine whether there will be a settlement 





at least as often, it seems, judges take them on as their own to decide. 
This stepped-up judicial role on questions of how reasonable investors 
think has been noted by a number of legal scholars, some of whom 
express doubt about whether such judges are usurping the fact-finding 
prerogative of juries.30  
Here, I want put both motivation and procedural legitimacy to the side 
and dig more deeply into the norms of “implicature” associated with a 
looming or imminent disaster—what investors are likely (or should be 
entitled) to draw from corporate statements about the risk and reality 
beyond the strict confines of the words employed.  Implicature is used by 
philosophers who study truth-telling and lies to explain, for instance, why 
it is deceitful to respond accurately to a request for directions to a gas 
station from a hapless out-of-town visitor without mentioning that the gas 
station is closed.31 It is, because the speaker was signaling a willingness to 
be helpful and cooperative, and instead being just the opposite.  Our 
question, essentially, is whether corporate executives should be held to a 
similarly cooperative signal when communicating with investors, or to 
something different. 
Certain patterns of argument are typical in these cases.  Defendants 
commonly claim that whatever was said, no matter how upbeat, was too 
general, speculative or vague to be anything more than “puffery,” so that 
it was neither material nor misleading no matter what was not being 
said.32  The reasonable investor, they say, knows enough not to rely on 
                                                 
30 How courts make such decisions as a matter of law is unclear. One influential article claims that 
judges are largely disinterested in these kinds of cases, and employ simple (and often empirically 
doubtful) heuristics.  Stephen Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way 
Everyone Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Law Opinions, 51 Emory L.J. 83 (2002); see 
also Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 903 (2002). Or perhaps politics are at 
work, so that business friendliness is the real driver behind the rate of aggressive dismissals.  Id.  I have 
argued that judges are inclined substitute themselves for the reasonable investor and ask whether they 
would have felt misled, which introduces a bias when the judge has an inflated sense of self-efficacy or 
unrealistically demanding sense of how investors should react to disclosures. See Donald C. Langevoort, 
Review Essay: Are Judges Motivated to Create “Good” Securities Fraud Doctrine?, 51 Emory L.J. 309 (2002). 
31  See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS, ch. 2 (1989).  For a sampling of the literature 
putting implicature to use in business settings, see Robert Bloomfield, A Pragmatic Approach to More 
Efficient Corporate Disclosure, 26 Acct. Horizons 357 (2012); Langevoort & Gulati, supra; Peter Tiersma, 
The Language of Silence, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1995).  
32 See City of Pontiac Ret. System v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2014)(“It is well established 
that general statements about reputation, integrity and compliance with ethical norms are inactionable 
‘puffery,’ meaning that they are too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon them”).  For a 





statements devoid of hard facts or concrete representations, and can read 
between the lines well enough to know what is not being said and hence 
tread carefully, not assume that they’ve been told all that is important.  
Soft language, in other words, doesn’t matter at all.  This is often 
bolstered by the argument that the securities laws are not meant to force 
corporations to accuse themselves of wrongdoing or mismanagement. 
This becomes the contested territory that judges have to work their way 
through.   
There are countless examples of this battling: the Deepwater Horizon 
and Fundao dam cases have already been noted, and there are so many 
others plucked out of recent headline news (Volkswagen,33 Wells Fargo,34 
etc.).  For our purposes, an especially intriguing example involves a lesser 
kind of disaster: the Hewlett-Packard corporate governance scandal, 
wherein its highly-regarded CEO was forced out after allegations of 
sexual harassment and a cover-up. Were statements he and others made 
touting HP’s improved code of conduct—a response to an earlier 
corporate governance disaster at the company—misleading for failure to 
disclose his apparent disregard of it?  The Ninth Circuit said no,35 but why 
not?  The opinion offers a jumble of reasons, none particular incisive.  
The remainder of this part seeks a better way of answering the question. 
 
B. “Voluntary” Disclosures 
 
We start the search by looking at the legal context surrounding the 
disclosure and asking whether it voluntary or required pursuant to SEC 
rule.  Presumably, investor assumptions and expectations change when 
they receive a message voluntarily offered as compared to one made 
under the compulsion of a disclosure regime meant for their benefit.  
Because the SEC is the disclosure standard-setter, it might seem logical to 
start with the latter.  But for reasons that will become clear, most disaster 
disclosure issues arise out of voluntary disclosures, where the judicial 
                                                 
33  In re Volkswagen (Clean Diesel) Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 99,817 (N.D. Cal., July 
19, 2017). 
34  In re Wells Fargo & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 99,900 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 4, 2017). 
35  See Retail, Hotel & Dep’t Store Local 338 Pension Fund v. Hewlett Packard Co., 845 F.3d 1268 (9th 





responses focus entirely on whether what was said was misleading or not.  
So we begin there. 
It has long been acknowledged that investors have a strong thirst for 
information well beyond what mandatory disclosure offers, especially 
with respect to forward-looking information.  Securities analysts take the 
lead here to lobby on behalf of institutional clients and (on the sell-side) 
the public investors who read their reports, seeking access to 
management insights via both conference calls and private audiences with 
management within limits set by the SEC.36  Pressure to disclose comes 
from other sources as well—the financial media, stock exchanges, 
regulators, social and investor activists, and the like.  In the aggregate, 
these are the uncomfortable demands of publicness.37 
Managers have discretion in whether and how to respond.  They may 
be hesitant, under advice from their own lawyers, to makes disclosures 
that might create inflated expectations and generate future litigation.  
And certainly they would prefer not, all other things being equal, to 
reveal their failures and troublesome risks.  But they cannot ignore the 
financial market pressures, either.  A large literature in financial 
economics has studied voluntary disclosure choices and found 
considerable variance in practice depending as to whom management 
mainly caters.38  Where a company’s investor base is transient (i.e., made 
up of active traders), failure to develop a reputation for real-time candor 
will result in a depressed stock price, which management may well prefer 
to avoid.  Voluntary disclosure will fairly robust as a result, as long as the 
rewards to candor outweigh the costs.  In contrast, short-run voluntary 
                                                 
36  See Lawrence D. Brown et al., Inside the Black Box of “Sell Side” Financial Analysts, 53 J. Acct. Res. 1 
(2015); Lawrence D. Brown et al., The Activities of Buy-Side Analysts and the Determinants of their Stock 
Recommendations, 62 J. Acct. & Econ. 139 (2016).  The SEC’s Regulation FD bars selective disclosure to 
analysts, in order to force issuers into public disclosure of any material nonpublic information they 
want to disclose at all. 
37 See note --- supra. 
38  E.g., Douglas Skinner, Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News?, 32 J. Acct. Res. 38 (1994).  In law, 
an important debate emerged in the 1980s about whether mandatory disclosure was necessary in light 
of the pressures and incentives for voluntary disclosure, and if so, how and why—one that continues 
today.  See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. 
L. Rev. 669 (1984); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 722 (1984); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998); Merritt Fox, Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is 
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335 (1999).  For a more recent assessment by financial 
economists, see Luca Enriques & Sergio Gilota, Disclosure and Financial Regulation, in NIAMH MOLONEY 





disclosure incentives diminish in potency when the investor base is less 
focused on liquidity or management is more indifferent to stock price 
pressures.   
These are purely financial incentives.  But as society has become more 
sensitive to private sector risk-taking in the face of environmental and 
other “sustainability” threats, worries about looming disasters become of 
general political interest, too.  Climate change palpably triggers such 
short and long-term concerns, as do matters of safety, cybersecurity, 
human rights, etc. Hence there is considerable pressure on companies to 
address these issues on a regular basis for a broader audience, increasingly 
in elaborate written reports.  The content of these sustainability reports 
will often be directly at issue in disaster-related securities fraud claims. 
The growing interest in “ESG” (environmental, social and governance) 
disclosure is at least partly non-financial—prodding companies toward 
greater social responsibility for its own sake—but the distinction is 
fuzzy.39 Companies indifferent to sustainability may lag financially, and 
more and more long-term investors report being interested in how 
management addresses these diffuse sorts of risks and handles stresses 
when they occur.40  In other words, there is a large group of people 
interested in sustainability disclosure for diverse reasons that are 
impossible to separate.   
This multi-sourced public angst—which management probably sees as 
both unreasonable and excessive—naturally tempts those who speak on 
the issuer’s behalf to try to manage impressions so as to reduce the 
pressures.  Voluntary disclosures tend to accentuate the positive, though 
the optimism may be tempered by lawyer-driven warnings about 
forward-looking uncertainty. And that takes us back to fraud-on-the-
market litigation.  After a disaster happens, plaintiffs’ counsel will comb 
through everything said earlier in an upbeat fashion to identify what 
possibly may have had the propensity to mislead investors, all of which 
                                                 
39 See Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. 
Corp. L. 647 (2016). 
40 See Chitru S. Fernando et al., Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart 
Money, J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis (forthcoming, 2017). There is evidence of a separating equilibrium as 
between long-term patient investors and short-term traders, with the demand for sustainability 
disclosures being from the former and not the latter.  See Laura Starks et al., Corporate ESG Profiles and 
Investor Horizons, Oct. 2017, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049943.  In turn, the level of voluntary ESG 





(with the accompanying scienter allegations) becomes the core of their 
fraud-on-the-market lawsuit.  Plaintiffs search for blatant lies if possible, 
but more likely half-truths.  Complaints usually offer scores of individual 
statements said to have deceived, which courts will have to evaluate one-
by-one in response to defendants’ inevitable motion to dismiss.  How 
they do this is worth more careful attention. 
  
1.  Language Matters, Even in Efficient Markets 
  
Probably the most common explanation courts give for a skeptical 
approach to whether a reasonable investor would be misled by any kind of 
soft pre-disaster language is that investors are savvy lot, steely-eyed and 
not easily tricked.  Of course judges do understand that many retail 
investors are not particularly sophisticated, but at least in fraud-on-the-
market cases, they generally work on the assumption that the smart 
money drives securities prices, thus justifying heightened rigor. This is the 
assumption, for example, behind the puffery doctrine noted earlier, 
whereby courts routinely dismiss fraud claims based on general 
statements of optimism, no matter how ugly the concealed truth really 
might be.41  Puffery is the label courts most often use in disaster cases 
when dismissing cases on duty grounds, essentially saying that since 
investors are unlikely to any attention to what was said in the first place, 
they could not have been misled by what was omitted.  The same thing 
happens in treatments of forward-looking statements like the “bespeaks 
caution” doctrine (dismissing claims where investors are warned about 
future uncertainties)42 or the notion that projections or estimates are not 
actionable unless characterized as reasonably certain to occur.  
While many of these holdings simply accord with common sense, 
aggressively invoking the imaginary mindset of the sophisticated investor 
to decide these cases has two problems.  One is that it proves way too 
much.  A thoroughly savvy, skeptical investor would never draw any 
                                                 
41  E.g., David Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1395 (2006); Stefan Padfield, Is 
Puffery Material to Investors?, Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10 U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 339, 354 (2008); 
Cox, supra. 





inference beyond what explicitly was said, if that, and would assume 
instead that any hedged or limited statement was an effort to avoid 
revealing anything more. But that renders the half-truth doctrine useless, 
contrary to the prominence it has in the text of Rule 10b-5 and the ample 
judicial embrace the doctrine has received.  A meaningful half-truth 
principle has to have some room for credulity.43 But once we concede 
that, it is hard to know when to stop. 
The other problem is an empirical one.  In looking at actual investor 
behavior (or price formation) in well-organized markets, what do we 
observe with respect to the influence of wordplay?  For a long time, 
assumptions about market efficiency supported a reflexive stance in fraud-
on-the-market cases.  If market prices adjust immediately and in unbiased 
fashion to all news that becomes publicly available, we can surmise that in 
equilibrium the prevailing market price accurately reflect the fundamental 
value of the issuer’s shares. The mechanisms of market efficiency involve, 
for the most part, the influence of professionally informed investors 
(active institutional investors), who pay for the best-available analysis and 
advice.44  For some time, sociologists and organizational behavior scholars 
have believed that companies often successfully use sleights of hand to 
mislead investors,45 to which the dismissive response from financial 
economists (if they paid attention to the work at all) was that such 
credulousness could not possibly survive the rigors of market discipline.  
Courts might thus be excused for assuming that these professionals are 
always the aforementioned utility maximizers, thoroughly immune to 
puffery or cheap talk.46  
Today, however, there is greater inclination to accept that market 
imperfections are persistent.  Though well-oiled markets surely remain 
the best available source of valuation even with these imperfections, 
                                                 
43 One could take this a step further and ask why any truly savvy person would ever rely on anything 
said by someone with conflicting interests, absent some form of proof?  (This, of course, is the 
economist’s famous “lemons problem”).  The law of fraud is an entitlement that invites and protects 
reliance in the face of doubts about credibility, thereby lowering transaction costs. 
44  The classic article on the subject is Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984); more recently, see Ronald Gilson & Reinier Krakkman, Market 
Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 Va. L. Rev. 313 (2014). 
45 E.g., James Westphal & Edward Zajac, The Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate Governance 
Reforms and Shareholder Reactions, 43 Admin. Sci.Q. 127 (1998). 
46  On the tendency of earlier courts to invoke unrealistically demanding views of market efficiency in 





market efficiency is viewed more as an idealized goal than descriptive 
reality, largely because of high information costs.47  Even professional 
investors have limited resources and capacity for attention,48 and use 
short-cuts to optimize their valuation models, not try to perfect them.  As 
Andrew Lo puts it, markets may be adaptively efficient in that they 
continuously learn and hence improve toward the ideal, but repeatedly 
fall short in an always-changing and costly informational environment.49  
This subject has received considerable scholarly attention in both law and 
finance, and made its way into the arguments before the Supreme Court 
in 2014 on whether the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance was 
still viable.  (In Halliburton II, the Court said it was.50)   
That more realistic approach, however, doesn’t by itself prove that 
wordplay matters.  Highly relevant but less familiar to lawyers, however, 
is a fast-emerging body of research in financial economics on the role of 
language in corporate disclosure.  The impetus for this empirical work is 
the desire to improve the prediction of both good and bad futures for 
issuers via machine learning that looks for clues in how they speak to 
investors—tone, use of key words, length of sentences, focal points, 
etc.—separate and distinct from the hard information explicitly contained 
in the disclosures like the latest earnings per share.51  For example, a shift 
over time to less readability (signaling obfuscation) correlates with a drop 
in later financial performance even though nothing actually said in the 
disclosures warned of the reasons for that decline.52   
One important message of this work is that ordinary language indeed 
matters more than we had thought. Of course, the empirical findings give 
                                                 
47 There is also considerable interest in the possibility that behavioral biases may influence market 
prices.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135 (2002).   
48 See David Hirshleifer et al., Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News, 
64 J. Fin. 2289 (2009). 
49 Andrew Lo, Reconciling Efficient Markets with Behavioral Finance: The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, 7 J. 
Inv. Consult. 21 (2005). 
50 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S.Ct. 2389 (2014).  The Court explicitly said that 
imperfect efficiency is not inconsistent with the reasons for the presumption of reliance in well-
organized markets.   
51 A good survey of this work is Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Textual Analysis in Accounting and 
Finance: A Survey, 54 J. Acct. Res. 1187 (2016). 
52  E.g., Gerard Hoberg & Craig Lewis, Do Fraudulent Firms Produce Abnormal Disclosure?, 43 J. Corp. Fin. 
58 (2017); see also Xuan Huang et al., Tone Management, 89 Acct. Rev. 1083 (2014); David Larcker & 
A. Zarolyurina, Detecting Deceptive Discussions in Conference Calls, 50 J. Acct. Res. 495 (2012); Jonathan 





sophisticated investors new arbitrage opportunities to erode these 
effects,53 and so this work has become of substantial interest as an 
algorithmic tool.54  On the other hand, it also demonstrates that the 
market is susceptible to language-based impression management. 
Wording, syntax, hyperbole, euphemisms,55 tone etc. influence investors 
and prices, though how much and for how long will vary.  There is 
evidence that market prices underreact to the reality revealed by such 
cues, so that the price effects of deception continue over time.56 
A plausible explanation for this, taking us back to our discussion of 
implicature, is that sophisticated investors use management credibility as a 
common heuristic to simplify their task.  There is ample evidence that 
credibility is a variable in the fundamental valuation calculus; over time 
investors form impressions of how reliable managers are and act 
accordingly.  (This is one reason for stock price drops in the aftermath of 
disaster that seem to exceed the fundamental value of the bad news in 
question—they reflect a downward revision of credibility as well, calling 
into question other value assumptions as well.57) When credibility is high 
based on prior experience, even general optimism can be influential when 
it responds to some matter on which management has exclusive 
knowledge.  So if management is asked how the current quarter is shaping 
up compared to last year, “fine” (or “beautifully”) could mislead if the 
truth was substantially at odds.  And merely warning that the future is 
unpredictable and that things could go awry would not undermine the 
value of a revenue estimate when there is high credibility.  Unfortunately, 
looming disasters often enough cause previously credible managers to 
                                                 
53  There is substantial evidence, for example, at sophisticated analysts pick up on tone “tips and tells.”  
See Marina Druz et al., Reading Managerial Tone: How Analysts and the Market Respond to Conference Calls 
(NBER working paper, Jan. 2016).  Presumably this arbitrage will improve pricing in light of what the 
cures reveal, though one wonders whether managers, too, will change their language in response. 
54 Recent advances in algorithmic trading apply syntax and tone assessments to various forms of news 
releases to trigger high-speed trades.  For an expression of concern about this kind of trading, see Yesha 
Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Financial Markets, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 1607 (2015).  
Not surprisingly, the SEC is interested in the work as well as a tool for the early identification of fraud 
risk. 
55  See Kate Suslava, “Stiff Business Headwinds and Uncharted Economic Waters:” The Use of Euphemisms in 
Earnings Conference Calls, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2876819 
(July 17, 2017).   
56  See Joshua Lee, Can Investors Detect Managers’ Lack of Spontaneity?: Adherence to Predetermined Scripts 
During Earnings Conference Calls, 91 Acct. Rev. 229 (2016); see also Huang et al., supra, uncovering 
strong evidence that tone misinforms market actors. 





spend, if not waste, their reputational capital in order to avoid blame.  
Nor must such deception necessarily be intentional: there are non-verbal 
cues in managerial communications that signal cognitive dissonance (the 
unconscious discomfort of seeking to reconcile prior beliefs and 
commitments with new disconfirming information).58 
Hiding behind euphemisms, puffery or what might be technically true 
but nonetheless misleading can be especially pernicious.  Ample evidence 
shows that people tend to believe that such “artful paltering” is less 
objectionable than making a positive misrepresentation—in other words, 
the internal norms that warn us not to lie are weaker with respect to half-
truths.  Thus “individuals may deceive both more frequently and more 
effectively by paltering than using lies of commission or omission.”59  If 
language does matter, courts should be especially alert for such 
temptations, particularly when disaster threatens, and certainly not 
assume them away. 
 
   2.  Normative Guidance 
 
We’ve now seen that there are problems in simply assuming away the 
influence of soft language, particularly in world where credibility matters.  
But none of this tells courts what to do instead.  To me, the essential 
starting point is to acknowledge that the goal in fraud-on-the-market 
cases is not about predicting how investors respond to words.  Rather, 
the remedy is an entitlement given to investors in order to facilitate 
reliance even where it might be palpably risky given asymmetric 
information and the arms-length nature of the bargain.  It is more about 
right to rely than but-for causation. This idea underlies the fraud-on-the-
market presumption as what I have described as an offering of “juristic 
grace.”60 The Supreme Court in both Basic and Halliburton II affords 
investors a presumption of reliance on the integrity of the prevailing 
market price (i.e., that it is undistorted by fraud) not because smart 
                                                 
58  See Jessen L. Hobson et al., Analyzing Speech to Detect Financial Misreporting, 50 J. Acct. Res. 349 
(2012). 
59  Todd Rogers et al., Artful Paltering: The Risks and Rewards of Using Truthful Statements to Mislead Others, 
112 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 456 (2016). 





investors naively assume management integrity, but because offering it 
stimulates socially valuable investment in the face of risk.61    
We can see this normative turn in other Supreme Court decisions as 
well. In the Virginia Bankshares case,62 the defense claimed that smart 
investors never rely on statements of opinion by boards of directors, 
especially when the board was chosen by the interested party to a 
transaction, a controlling shareholder.  But they certainly have a right to, 
said the Court, given the board’s superior access to information and the 
norms of fiduciary responsibility.  And more recently in Omnicare,63 the 
argument was made that statements of opinion surely convey nothing to 
the cautious investor beyond the honesty of the underlying belief, if that.  
But the Court rejected the argument and opened the door for plaintiffs to 
draw inferences from what was said that go beyond the strict textual 
confines of the words used, thereby weakening what had been a powerful 
defense tactic embraced by many lower courts.64   
So predicting simply what savvy investors do or don’t believe isn’t 
really the right approach in the first place, even if it is knowable. But what 
is, beyond saying that the focus should be on facilitating reliance of the 
sort that merits encouragement and protection, including some degree of 
reliance on credibility? Omnicare offers a useful starting point, but 
ultimately reduces the inquiry to a factual question on propensity to 
mislead on which, it assumes, lower courts have ample experience and 
expertise.  Its exegesis was thus fairly limited in terms of guidance for 
future cases (or even the one at hand), and can be read as either 
encouraging, restrictive or both in terms of the scope of the half-truth 
doctrine as applied to statements of opinion. 65   
                                                 
61 See also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 Duke 
L.J. 711 (2006). 
62 Virginia Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). 
63 Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Pension Fund, 135 S.Ct. 1318 (2015). 
64 E.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2011)(no liability for any form of 
opinion absent evidence of subjective disbelief).  The Second Circuit has acknowledged that Fait’s per se 
holding does not stand after Omnicare.  See Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 209 (2d Cir. 2016). 
65 135 S.Ct. at 1332 (showing an actionable omission is “no small task for an investor”).  Sadly, too 
many lower courts have taken that particular language in the Court’s opinion as encouragement to hold 
onto their overly rigid pre-Omnicare ways even though invited to think more expansively.  For surveys 
of Omnicare and its aftermath, see Robert A. Van Kirk & John S. Williams, The Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Omnicare: The View from Two Years Out, 49 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (Bloomberg) 1264 (Aug. 7, 2017); 





Based on all the foregoing, there are some useful first principles from 
which to derive an approach to interpretation in disaster cases.  The 
fraud-on-the-market theory is focused on price distortion, which includes 
price maintenance as well as price movement in response to what was said 
and not said. Price formation is a product of a reasonably sophisticated 
“conversation” that goes on continuously among the issuer’s management 
and a diverse set of investors, in which credibility varies and plays a key 
role.  Participants draw meaning from the issuer’s representations in this 
expansive context.  From that, it seems to me, courts should use the 
cooperation principle as the presumptive background norm for 
interpretation: normally (but not always) soft words and phrases should 
be read as intended to help guide investors toward accurate inferences 
about value and risk, not as gamesmanship about which to be skeptical.  
This is not cause to dumb down the standard for a right to rely to the 
most unsophisticated investor.  Some of the heuristic principles courts 
have used in fraud-on-the-market cases are perfectly sound in this light.  
For example, such investors can fairly be held to draw from other 
information readily available in the public domain in forming impressions, 
so that they shouldn’t expect to be told what is already readily findable.66 
Or, as the Court stressed in Omnicare, the careful use of words like “in our 
opinion” naturally send a cautionary note that distinguishes such a message 
from one that is totally unqualified. 
Crucially, the setting in which the communication is made matters. 
In Omnicare, the fact that the opinion about legal compliance was made in 
a registration statement signaled that it was the product of the intense 
labor and scrutiny that comes with due diligence in a registered public 
offering.67  Such words signal that they derive from a particularly rigorous 
process of information-elicitation, and thus convey more than a top of the 
head opinion.68  An executive tweet would probably be the opposite, 
conveying informality.  That doesn’t mean it comes without implications; 
just that the implications suggest some less rigor from which to draw 
extended inferences.   
                                                 
66  For a case where finding the facts might have been possible but too difficult, in the court’s opinion, 
see In re Massey Energy Co., Sec. Litig., 883 F. Supp.2d 597, 618-19 (S.D.W. Va. 2012). 
67  Omnicare, 135 S.Ct. at 1330. 
68  Hillary Sale and I argue elsewhere that the Securities Exchange Act disclosure process is much closer 
to the Securities Act than different from it, so that a comparable inference is fair for the public company 





Attention to context and background norms sounds obvious in setting 
principles of inference, but a careful review of the case law shows how 
often courts operate differently.69   As noted earlier, quite a few 
commentators have taken courts to task for their approach to the puffery 
defense.  And indeed, many courts act as if there is a dictionary of words 
and phrases that everyone understands lack communicative content.  But 
that is questionable, even though we might agree that sometimes the 
proper inference is that one is not being told anything of importance. If, 
for example, the corporate communication responds to a legitimate 
question with a positive generality and there is no obvious means for 
further clarification, the implication should at least be that the hidden 
truth is not thoroughly bad.70  So, too, with half-truths.  The worse the 
news is that is unrevealed, the less fair it is to opportunistically use literal 
truth as a means to conceal, especially if the matter has already sparked 
investor interest.71 
This connects to the main issue in so many disaster cases—the extent 
to which the statements made put the fact that was concealed sufficiently 
“in play” that the duty to disclose applies.  Merely touching on a subject 
does not put it in play, nor does the simple fact that a code of ethics or 
some other general statement promises a commitment to integrity.72  But 
if the apparent motivation for what is said, however soft, was to respond 
to a matter of palpable interest to investors but hide a harsher truth, the 
case for deception strengthens. Those courts that find an issue to be in 
play by reference to how many time the issuer repeated the soft 
assurances are right to do so.73  The same with evidence showing high 
levels of investor interest in a matter (i.e., oil rig safety).  These 
                                                 
69 Indeed, the idea that plaintiffs’ allegations of misrepresentation must be analyzed one-by-one in 
isolation is inconsistent with a common sense approach to inference in context. 
70  See Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 745 (7th Cir. 1997). 
71 I explored the connections among puffery, contextualism and half-truth in Langevoort, Half-Truths, 
supra.  More recently, see Cox, supra; Sale & Langevoort, supra, at 779; Lipton, supra, at 140-41. 
72 For a good discussion of the case law here, with an acknowledgement that the general principle may 
give way in a particular context, see In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp.3d 731, 754-57 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
73  In the pre-explosion portion of the Deepwater Horizon case, the court stressed how often BP 
seemed to emphasize its vaunted safety procedures and processes without disclosing that they did not 
fully apply to BP’s non-wholly owned assets. In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 922 F. Supp.2 600, 623 (S.D. 
Tex. 2013).  See also In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 3822755 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) at *10 
(stressing commitment “over and over and over”); In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp.3d 368, 381 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015)(taking into account repeated efforts to parry and reassure investors in light of 





principles of inference in particular lead me to the impression that the 
Ninth Circuit was wrong to dismiss the claims in the Hewlett-Packard 
case, described earlier.74  While corporate ethics statements might be 
deemed trivial to sophisticated investors in the abstract, the context to 
the case seemed to be HP’s ability to emerge from its earlier governance 
scandal, for which the strong leadership of its CEO, Mark Hurd, was 
crucial.  I see HP’s statements as a deliberate effort to assuage investor 
unease and identify strength and integrity as strong points.75  If so, and 
Hurd had gained credibility among analysts and investors, this 
conversation thread may have mattered more than the court assumed, and 
the failure to reveal the disdain and ethical risk-taking would be quite 
consequential.  As another court of appeals put it better in addressing this 
same kind of issue, liability makes sense when there are statements by the 
issuer “that emphasize its reputation for integrity or ethical conduct as 
central to its financial condition or are clearly designed to distinguish the 
company from other specified companies in the same industry.”76 
A final—and admittedly more complicated—principle of inference 
goes to the degree of voluntariness of the statement.  This connects 
closely to the “in play” idea just noted.  Properly understood, what those 
courts that find a duty seem to recognize is that when the disclosure is 
unprompted and apparently quite voluntary, investors should be able to 
infer that the issuer is motivated by a genuine desire to reveal, and hence 
are entitled to draw broader inferences consistent with what is said 
explicitly, especially if the issuer keeps insistently repeating a message for 
emphasis.  On the other hand, when an issuer makes a statement that 
reflects that it does not really want to speak but is under pressure or 
compulsion to do so, the investor should be more hesitant to draw strong 
inferences regarding things unsaid.  This, as we will see shortly, arises 
especially with respect to legal compliance.   
 
 C.  Reporting Obligations and Line-item Disclosures 
                                                 
74  See note --- supra. 
75 The court acknowledges that Hurd led a charge to change perceptions of HP’s integrity and conduct 
norms after the earlier scandal, and says that it would have been a closer case had the sexual scandal 
been more closely related to the prior governance scandal.  845 F.3d at 1278. 






As noted, courts today are insistent that broad disclosure duties are 
for the SEC or Congress for formulate, not for the courts to invent.77  
Thus, in search of liability for pre-disaster concealment plaintiffs naturally 
look to the numerous line-items, mostly found in the SEC’s Regulation S-
K, that impose a requirement to reveal information investors supposedly 
want and need via periodic filings that are (almost) instantly made 
available on the internet.  Buttressing this is the Commission’s own half-
truth rule, forcing issuers to add further material information necessary to 
make the responses complete.   
This route has many obstacles.  Reg S-K is extensive and dense, 
enough so that both Congress and the SEC are currently seeking to prune 
it.78 Yet what is striking about these line-item requirements is how much 
potentially material information is not subject to any disclosure obligation.  
Many have pointed out how poorly the current mandatory disclosure 
regime speaks to issues relation to the modern corporation, especially as 
to opportunities and risk relating to intellectual property and human 
capital.79  What they have done operate mainly with a short to medium 
term horizon, even though many long-term investors and sustainability 
proponents want and need a longer outlook.80  The SEC long adhered to a 
                                                 
77  See Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories Inc., 269 F.3d 806 (7th Cir 2001)(“judges have no authority to 
scoop the political branches and adopt continuous disclosure under the banner of Rule 10b-5”).  The 
SEC has adopted a specific half-truth prohibition for SEC filings under the Securities Exchange Act, 
Rule 12b-20. There are two other fraud-based exceptions.  The so-called “duty to correct” holds that if 
the issuer previously made a misstatement but in good faith so that no liability follows, it nonetheless 
has a duty to correct it when the truth is discovered.  See id.  The “duty to update” is accepted by some 
courts but not others.  See id.; Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1996).  It holds that 
an issuer must update an earlier statement that no longer is accurate even though it was when originally 
made, if (but only if) the earlier statement implied to a reasonable investor that it could be relied upon 
beyond the time of its making, i.e., was “still alive” in the marketplace.  Though potentially powerful, 
lawyers came to see that the duty to update could largely be disclaimed by stating in the original 
disclosure that it spoke only to the moment, and that the issuer was assuming no duty to update.  See, 
e.g., Greenthal v. Joyce, 2916 WL 362312 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 29, 2016).  As a result, duty to update 
cases are less frequent today.  But see Finnerty v. Stiefel Laboratories Inc., 756 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 
2014); In re Facebook IPO Litig., 986 F. Supp.2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
78  See Release No. 33-10064, April 13, 2016, at 204-10; Roberta Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC 
is Riding Off in Two Directions at Once, 71 Bus. Law. 781 (2016). 
79 See Baruch Lev, Evaluating Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 29 J. App. Corp. Fin. 70 (2017). 
80 Other major countries around the world (in the European Union and Australia, most notably) have 
more expansive corporate disclosure requirements See Dale Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a 






policy limiting disclosure to historical, backwards-looking, facts, not 
forward-looking information even though that is the more value-relevant 
to investors; the effects of this are still felt today.  Another purported 
explanation is clarity: giving issuers and their lawyers more definition in 
what disclosure is required, to avoid even more overload.  But deeper 
than these is an uneasy recognition of the need for corporate secrecy on 
many matters, especially forward-looking ones, lest the company be 
hampered in its ability to compete, or not invest in strategies or products 
whose value would disappear if the information was publicly available to 
competitors and others.  Unfortunately, the effect of a duty limited to 
line item instructions is to offer this zone of secrecy whether or not there 
are truly good reasons for it as to particular facts or fears.  The pressure 
from investors for more extensive voluntary disclosures stems from these 
limits.   
Two line-item requirements are most often invoked by plaintiffs in 
disaster cases in their effort to find actionable omissions.81  One, found in 
the instructions to the 10-K and 10-Q, seems particularly promising: 
companies have to identify the most significant risk factors they face, 
updated on a quarterly basis.82  But this has turned out to be disappointing 
as an early warning device for a handful of reasons.  First, and most 
importantly, it requires identification, but not assessment—that is, 
describing kinds of risk, but not explicitly requiring discussion of either 
probability that they will come to pass or impact on the company if they 
do.  The disclosures can easily devolve to boilerplate, offering a recitation 
of risks the majority of which an intelligent investor could surmise even 
without the disclosure.  This is not to say that the risk disclosure line item 
is worthless.83  Careful readers of an issuer’s SEC filings can notice 
changes from quarter to quarter that signal the emergence of something 
that caused its lawyers to add to the recitation, suggesting that the level of 
                                                 
81  These are not the only possible line items, but they are the most likely to relate to a concealed risk.  
As to corporate governance, the SEC has a specific requirement to describe the extent of the board of 
directors’ role in risk management, and how it undertakes that role.  See Item 407(h) of Regulation S-
K.   
82  The ’34 Act filing instructions cross-reference Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K, which involves risk 
disclosures in public offerings. 
83  See A.C. Pritchard & Karen Nelson, Carrot or Stick? The Shift from Voluntary to Mandatory Disclosure of 
Risk Factors, 13 J. Emp. Leg. Studies 266 (2016); Ole-Kristian Hope et al., The Benefits of Specific Risk 
Factor Disclosures, 21 Rev. Acct’g Studies 1005 (2016).  In addition, the SEC staff comments on a filing 





worry about that particular subject had risen.  These sophisticated 
investors can then follow up with questions to the company or do further 
research.  But the identification itself is little more than a potential 
conversation starter, by itself revealing little about what might be a 
looming, serious risk.  Finally, like all quarterly reporting obligations, it is 
not a real-time requirement triggered when the risk level increases, but 
one that can wait for as many as ninety days.   
Of more help is Item 303 of Reg S-K: management’s discussion and 
analysis (the MD&A).  In the eyes of the SEC, this is clearly meant as an 
early warning device, designed to alert investors as to risks, trends and 
uncertainties with respect to the conduct of business that might make it 
unwise for investors to rely on past performance as a future indicator.84 
The Commission staff has highlighted the MD&A as quite relevant to 
disclosure of environmental risks,85 for example, as well as cybersecurity 
and other hot button topics.86  As mentioned earlier, an emerging body of 
empirical work using machine learning shows that the MD&A can be 
important not only for what the issuer reveals explicitly (again, especially 
changes from period to period) but how it “speaks.”87  Companies with 
something to hide appear to change their tone, use longer and more 
complex sentences, and seek to redirect reader attention away from the 
sensitive topic.  There is evidence that the obfuscation works.   
The MD&A, however, is less than entirely reliable as an early 
warning device.88  It has built-in limits, most importantly that the events, 
trends and uncertainties have to be “known” to management and 
“reasonably likely” to occur.89  Precisely what level of probability makes 
                                                 
84 See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Results of Operations, SEC Rel. No. 33-8350 (2003). 
85 See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Relating to Climate Change, SEC Release No. 33-
9106 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
86 SEC Div. of Corporation Finance, Disclosure Guidance Topic No. 2 (Oct. 13, 2011). The SEC is 
elevating the importance of cybersecurity, both as to disclosure and threats to customer and employee 
data privacy.  See SEC May Refresh Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance, 49 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (Bloomberg) 
1809 (Nov. 20, 2017). 
87  See pp. --- infra. 
88 See Stephen Brown & Jennifer Wu Tucker, Large Sample Evidence on Firm’s Year-to-Year MD&A 
Modifications, 49 J. Acct. Res. 309 (2011). 
89  See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1245 
(2003)(describing scuttled plans to alter the “reasonably likely” standard). In the Fudao dam case 
otherwise allowed to go forward for fraudulent misstatements and omissions in its voluntary 
disclosures, the court rejected plaintiffs’ Item 303 claim for lack of sufficient knowledge of a reasonably 





something reasonably likely has been debated for decades, without 
closure, but surely leaves room for management to determine that 
something, however worrisome, hasn’t yet met that subjective threshold.  
The knowledge requirement can also be troublesome with respect to the 
kind of risk-related information that gets diffused, distorted or suppressed 
within the corporate bureaucracy.  
Given the soft spots in the MD&A structure, its efficacy depends on 
enforcement intensity.90  The SEC does indeed stress MD&A compliance 
in comment letters and public statements, but enforcement seems 
somewhat muted.  Cases tend to be settled on cease and desist-type 
terms, without large sanctions.  SEC officials have long complained about 
the quality of MD&A disclosures.  That takes us back to our main subject 
here, the fraud-on-the-market action, which can put a much larger price-
tag on issuer non-compliance. 
There is an apparent split of authority in the circuits about whether 
private plaintiffs can invoke Item 303 (or indeed, any line-item 
requirement) to argue that its violation gives rise to damages, on which 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in early 2017 but then withdrew 
the grant at the request of the parties when the case was settled.91  That 
is, does the MD&A mandate establish a duty to disclose, the breach of 
which creates a 10b-5 violation assuming that plaintiffs satisfy all the other 
elements of the cause of action, including materiality and scienter?  The 
negative view is that SEC line-items create no independent private right 
of action, but instead are left entirely to SEC enforcement.  While that is 
certainly true, it misses the point.  To me, the answer to the duty 
question is fairly easy.92  Surely a blatant lie in the MD&A would be 
                                                 
90 For doubts about the SEC’s interest in environmental disclosure enforcement, see David W. Case, 
Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 379 (2005).  For an illustration of enforcement failure undermining the intentions for creating 
the disclosure in the first place, see Usha Rodrigues & Michael Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in 
Securities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2010). 
91  On the apparent split, compare, for example, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 
(2d Cir. 2015)(does create a duty) with In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 454, 465 (9th Cir. 
2014)(does not).  The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari was in Indiana Pub. Ret. System v. SAIC 
Inc., 818 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Leidos Inc. v. Indiana Pub. Ret. System, 137 
S.Ct. 1395 (2017).  For an argument that the impression of a circuit split is largely illusory, see 
Matthew Turk & Karen Woody, The Leidos Mixup and the Misunderstood Duty to Disclose in Securities Law, 
July 2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2996555.   
92  See Langevoort & Gulati, supra, at 1680-81.  But see Linda Griggs et al., When Rules Collide: Leidos, 





actionable fraud—no court has even suggested that a lie’s placement in a 
10-K somehow takes it out of Rule 10b-5.  Given this, we simply have to 
invoke the familiar coupling: the Rule also prohibits misstatements and 
omissions necessary to make what was said not misleading.  So the 
question comes down to whether intentionally failing to disclose 
something called for by Item 303 would mislead a reasonable investor.  
Assume that an issuer deliberately omits from the MD&A a serious 
known risk for fear that its revelation would damage the company near-
term.  Other risks, trends and uncertainties are fully discussed.  Would a 
reasonable investor infer from what is said that no other matters were 
required to be disclosed as per SEC instructions, so that we have the 
“omission of a material fact necessary to make statements made not 
misleading”?  Ordinarily, yes.  As courts have stressed, SEC rule-making 
is authoritative on what public companies have to disclose and investors 
are the intended beneficiaries of the mandate. It follows that investors 
should be entitled to assume compliance unless on notice otherwise.  The 
duty element would thus be satisfied.93  
Without such a rule, there would be a severe enforcement gap with 
respect the MD&A, one that could severely reduce its efficacy as an early 
warning device.  But even if the Court does what it should, enforcement 
intensity as to Item 303 is at best moderate, because of the built-in limits, 
the scienter requirement, and the various reasons that private class actions 
deliver imperfect deterrence when managers have selfish reasons to 
obfuscate but bear little personal risk of liability.  That said, the evidence 
supports an inference that private securities litigation adds a needed dose 
of deterrence to SEC enforcement,94 so that those worried about 
corporate candor with respect to disaster risk should pay close attention 
to future battling about the duty issue. 
 
 
                                                 
93  Id.  This would be different if the issuer made clear that it was not responding fully and completely, 
but that, of course, would not set well with the SEC.   
94 For discussions of the deterrence value of fraud-on-the-market cases, see, e.g., Cox & Thomas, 
supra; DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET AND 
THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 53-56 (2016); Christopher F. Baum et al., Securities Fraud and 
Corporate Board Turnover: New Evidence from Lawsuit Outcomes, 48 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 14 (2016); see also 
Dain C. Donelson et al., The Role of D&O Insurance in Securities Fraud Class Action Settlements, 58 J. L. & 





D.  The (Sometimes) Frustrating Statutory Safe Harbor 
 
In developing an approach to corporate implicature for fraud-on-the-
market cases, we have so far ignored a powerful statutory innovation 
created in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1996 that is 
much put to use in disaster litigation.  The so-called safe harbor for 
forward-looking information declares on its face that such information is 
not fraud for purposes of private securities litigation if either made 
without actual fraudulent intent or accompanied by “meaningful 
cautionary language” that warns investors of the risk that the forward-
looking information may not come to pass as predicted.  This was a 
codification of a judge-made “bespeaks caution” doctrine, albeit without 
the nuance some courts had brought to application of that principle.95  
When the issuer speaks to the future in addressing risks or lack thereof, 
the invitation is to add a disclaimer drawing investors’ attention to risk 
factors—usually, the same risk factors already set forth in the 10-K or Q 
as per the line-item instructions discussed above—that could affect the 
likelihood of whatever future circumstance the issuer is addressing.  If this 
works, the risk of liability disappears.96  The potency of the safe harbor is 
obvious in pre-crisis disaster cases because what is being challenged is 
often a forward-looking risk assessment.   
In terms of disclosure theory and practice, the safe harbor is a near-
absurdity.  Imagine that an issuer were to make a statement that its 
assessment of a catastrophic failure at a power plant was that it was highly 
unlikely.  In fact, there is private evidence of internal doubts about the 
accuracy of the risk assessment.  That would be false and misleading.  And 
it would be none the less so if the issuer added a disclaimer pointing to 
some risk factors.  This is the same point made about risk factor 
disclosure—it is of limited use if it fails to reveal internal probability 
estimates and simply states that the bad event is possible.  What is 
important is management’s determination that the event is highly 
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unlikely, assuming that it has a reputation for credibility.97  Otherwise, 
the warning is just noise.98 
But because the protection is a statutory command, absurdity doesn’t 
matter.  At best, the statutory safe harbor is a trade-off: effective 
immunization of forward-looking information from liability in order to 
encourage honest disclosures that would otherwise not be made because 
of fear of liability.  The empirical literature on the safe harbor is mixed as 
to whether the trade is a good one.99   
There is some good news, however, in the contextualism that many 
courts bring to the two interpretive questions that often come up in 
deciding whether the safe harbor protects some alleged falsity.  One is 
whether the issuer is truly speaking to the future or instead—fully or 
partially—addressing the present, which eliminates the statutory 
protection entirely.100  This is an exercise in implicature, because there 
are many statements that appear forward-looking on their face but also 
either say or imply something about current conditions.  The other 
interpretive question is whether the cautionary language is sufficiently 
meaningful.  Particularly striking here is the eagerness some courts 
demonstrate to consider whether the cautionary language itself might be 
misleading, for suggesting that the predicted risk is merely possible when 
management knows privately that it is actually coming to pass.101  So 
                                                 
97  See Jonathan L. Rogers & Phillip C. Stocken, Credibility of Management Forecasts, 80 Acct. Rev. 1233 
(2005). 
98  On investors’ perception of having been wronged in the face of cautionary language, see H. Scott 
Asay & Jeffrey Hales, Disclaiming the Future: Investigating the Impact of Cautionary Disclaimers on Investor 
Judgments Before and After Experiencing Economic Loss, Sept. 2017, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2573333.   
99  For a good summary of costs and benefits, see Marilyn F. Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities 
Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward Looking Information by High Technology Firms, 39 J. Acct’g Res. 
297 (2001)(more disclosure but diminished accuracy). 
100 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor’s Rocky Shore, 39 Sec. Reg. L.J. 257 
(2011).  On the distinction between present and forward-looking information when the two are 
bundled, see In re Quality Systems Inc. Sec. Litig., 865 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2017)(no protection for the 
non-forward looking parts of the bundle). 
101  E.g., Slayton v. American Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 770 (2d Cir. 2010); Arkansas Pub. Emp. 
Ret. System v. Harman Int’l Indus. Inc., 791 F.3d 90 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  In Loritz v. Exide 
Technologies Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 98,142 (C.D. Cal. 2014), the court observed that a 
warning that the corporation could not be sure that it “has been, or will be at all times, in complete 
compliance with all environmental requirements” was not meaningful enough when it knew of 





although the safe harbor is indeed a frequent obstacle for plaintiffs in 
disaster cases, it is not quite as forbidding as it might at first seem. 
 
II. GETTING CLOSER: GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS AND UNCHARGED 
CRIMINALITY 
 
 A.  Investigations and Regulatory Proceedings 
 
Further along the disclosure timeline in the run-up to a corporate 
disaster, there may be allegations made by plaintiffs that the issuer 
concealed the occurrence of some governmental investigation that was 
triggered by suspicion that something was wrong, or a routine inspection 
finding something amiss. These are particularly common, of course, with 
respect to compliance disasters.  Such governmental inquiries are part of 
the administrative state: they can be regulatory or criminal in nature, and 
at varying stages of formality and cause for concern.  When the following 
weeks or months bring a large-scale criminal prosecution or regulatory 
fine imposed on the issuer, there is a natural temptation to see the 
undisclosed investigation as a fraudulently concealed risk. 
There is a substantial body of case law on the materiality of 
unpublicized government investigations, which turns on the probability 
that the case will turn serious in terms of its implications for the issuer 
and the magnitude of the impact (in terms of fines, loss of business, 
disqualifications, etc.) if it does.102  These are hardly easy calculations, but 
one can imagine many situations where the threat emanating from an 
investigation tilts in favor of materiality even if the matter is far from 
resolved and might never result in any enforcement action or prosecution 
at all. 
                                                 
102  See David Stuart & David Wilson, Disclosure Obligations Under the Federal Securities Laws in Government 
Investigations, 64 Bus. Law. 973 (2009); see also Jonathan N. Eisenberg, Are Public Companies Required to 
Disclose Government Investigations?, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/22/are-
public-companies-required-to-disclose-government-investigations/ (July 22, 2015).  The “probability-
magnitude” test was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); 





But again, there is no per se duty to disclose an investigation even if 
deemed material, though my impression is that many practitioners say 
that they nonetheless urge clients disclose voluntarily. Whether there is a 
duty depends partially on what we have already surveyed. As to 
mandatory disclosure in SEC filings, is this a new risk factor or something 
that triggers the need for comment in the MD&A?  If so, duty kicks in as 
per our earlier discussion.  But there is more specific line-item to 
consider.  Item 103 requires a brief description of any material pending 
non-routine legal proceedings against the issuer or one of its subsidiaries.  
To this is added, somewhat ominously, similar disclosure as to “any such 
proceeding known to be contemplated by government authorities.” 
Beyond these familiar line-items, there are some particularized 
enhancements to the disclosure duty with respect to proceedings 
involving allegations of environmental law violations, which was part of 
an understanding reached between the SEC and environmental activists 
back in the 1970s.  Of more recent vintage, there are special rules on the 
disclosure of both pending and resolved enforcement actions taken by the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission against mining 
companies that are ’34 Act registrants.  This additional mine safety 
disclosure is noteworthy; researchers have found evidence that the 
addition in 2011 of this new public form of disclosure resulted in a 
noticeable reduction in safety violations, deaths and injuries—that is, a 
higher level of care—even though this data was already known to mine 
safety regulators and discoverable (albeit with considerable effort) on-
line.103  It is a pointed reminder that the benefits from public company 
disclosure are not simply from making the issuer’s stock price more 
accurate, and often as much about influencing behavior as generating 
information.   
Courts, however, seem surprisingly reluctant to invoke the generic 
line-item requirements to compel disclosure of investigations, especially 
when issuers have made boilerplate risk factor disclosure pointing out the 
inevitable risks highly regulated companies face with respect to legal 
compliance.104 To be sure, as many courts have said, the mere fact of an 
investigation triggers none of the line items. But once government 
                                                 
103 See Hans Christensen et al., The Real Effects of Mandatory Non-Financial Disclosures in Financial 
Statements, 64 J. Acct. & Econ. 284 (2017). 
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enforcers indicate that an action is likely, that would seem to at least 
satisfy Item 103’s “known to be contemplated” language.  Curiously, 
courts have found their way to saying that that phrase requires disclosure 
only of actions “substantially certain to occur.”105  To an issuer busily 
trying to persuade the government not to act or to impose only minor 
sanctions, this truncates the duty considerably.  The MD&A and risk 
factor disclosure have not fared that well as triggers for a duty to reveal 
investigations, either.  
Once again, half-truth once again seems to be the doctrine of choice 
for resolving these cases, especially when what plaintiffs want revealed is 
not just the fact of the investigation but an assessment of its seriousness as 
of the time of the disclosure.  This implicates the background norm set 
forth earlier about matters of special sensitivity, and may be a place where 
the presumption of cooperativeness in drawing inferences is less 
justifiable.  Legal risk is something on which companies cannot speak in 
depth without revealing too much of its hand in the on-going negotiations 
with regulators. While merely disclosing that an enforcement action is 
possible does not necessarily compromise a negotiating position, it is hard 
for the company to stop there. Stakeholders will ask for an assessment of 
claims and defenses, which is fraught territory.  As suggested, it is 
probably fair to say that the response as to both the possibility and impact 
of an investigation will be grudging and cautious, with no reason for 
investors to draw strong inferences one way or the other about things not 
said.  In the last few years, a notable handful of cases—enthusiastically 
welcomed by the defense bar and their clients—have rejected omission 
claims arising out of undisclosed, or minimally disclosed, 
investigations.106 
Issuers and their lawyers often try to finesse the nondisclosure of some 
pending investigation by saying something like “we are not aware of any 
pending government investigations that in our view would have a material 
impact on the company or its operations.”  They are hoping that the 
investigation will not in fact lead to a material sanction; if it does, they 
will say that they misestimated in good faith, latching onto phrases like “in 
                                                 
105  E.g., Richman v. Goldman Sachs, 868 F. Supp.2d 261, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Lion’s Gate 
Ent. Corp. Sec. Litig., 165 F. Supp.3d 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
106  See Lion’s Gate, supra.; see also Lubbers v. Flagstar Bancorp. Inc., 162 F. Supp.3d 571 (E.D. Mich. 





our view,” “we expect,” or similar equivocations, invoking a legacy from 
the pre-Omnicare days when courts reflexively protected statements of 
opinion absent evidence of deliberate deceit.   Invoking the norm of fair 
play referred to earlier, some judges have recently shown a willingness to 
declare such statements to be potential half-truths when what was 
undisclosed was a palpably serious threat, even though the extent of the 
threat was indeterminate at the time, and maybe even still.107  
 
 B.  Illegality 
 
Almost by definition, compliance-related corporate catastrophes are 
produced by an investigation that, eventually at least, uncovers evidence 
of some kind of pre-existing illegality on which the government brings 
charges. In that case, plaintiffs can point not only to the concealed 
investigation but the hidden fact of the underlying wrongdoing itself as a 
possible fraud.  If the argument succeeds,108 this locates the scheme to 
defraud further back in time, enlarging the plaintiff class.  But here, too, 
courts are often quick to say that silence—whether about illegality or 
anything else—is not fraudulent without showing that a duty was 
breached.109 
These are particularly hard cases for plaintiffs when there was no 
admission by the issuer of its wrongdoing or finding of such by a court or 
agency.  Courts are not particularly anxious to undertake a case-within-a-
case that requires litigation of the fact of the underlying misconduct 
followed by a determination of whether the nondisclosure was fraudulent 
in light of that fact.  They thus impose a high level of particularized 
pleading in support of the illegality.  But legal disaster cases are usually 
ones where the government has already done the heavy lifting on the 
illegality of what transpired, and the issuer may be precluded from 
denying the wrongdoing after a plea or non-prosecution deal.  That 
                                                 
107  The most notable case here is Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Cap. Mgt. Group LLC, 164 F. Supp.3d 568 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016).  See also In re BioScrip Inc. Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp.3d 711, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); In 
re FBR Sec. Litig., 544 F. Supp.2d 346, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
108  For an overview of possibilities, see Alison B. Miller, Note, Navigating the Disclosure Dilemma: 
Corporate Illegality and the Federal Securities Laws, 102 Geo. L.J. 1647 (2014). 





obviously strengthens plaintiffs’ claim.  Even then, however, many judges 
seem reluctant to make liability turn on the company’s failure to disclose 
its own wrongdoing.110  They often cite case law saying that the securities 
disclosure is not “a rite of confession,”111 nor meant to force self-
incrimination.112   
Most courts understand that corporations cannot lie about compliance, 
nor (as the Supreme Court specifically addressed in Omnicare) make 
affirmative statements about law-abidingness that may literally be true but 
misleading because of what wasn’t said.  But even here, many courts still 
seem skeptical.113  Take a situation where a pattern of bribery enabled a 
significant (i.e., material) amount of revenues during the most recent 
fiscal period, thereby boosting earnings per share over what they would 
have been or indicating fast growth for the firm.  It would seem obvious 
that omitting the fact of the illegality makes the reported financial results 
misleading.  Yet most courts say just the opposite: “the allegation that a 
corporation properly reported income that is alleged to have been, in 
part, improperly obtained is insufficient to impose Section 10(b) 
liability.”114 That is especially jarring given the well-established principle 
in criminal cases that compliance with generally accepted accounting 
principles does not necessarily protect against a claim of fraud.115 For 
better or worse, it usually takes more to cross the line, as with repeated 
touting of a commitment to compliance in the face of a pervasive criminal 
scheme116 or where the issuer puts its competitive success at issue without 
                                                 
110 For good discussions, see the Menaldi case, supra, and In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp.3d 
731 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).   
111  City of Pontiac Ret. System v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2014). 
112  Id.; see also United States v. Mathews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986). 
113 Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Cap. Mgt. Group LLC, 164 F. Supp.3d 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)(finding the 
statements about transparency and risk management commitments too vague).  See also id., 2017 WL 
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here, see In re BioScrip Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp.3d 711, 728-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)(finding statements to 
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114 In re Marsh & McLennan Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp.2d 452, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
115  United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
116 See Meyer v. Jinksolar Holdings Co., 761 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2014)(finding potential for deception in 
description of compliance program if there was a known failure to prevent on-going pollution 
problems.  The bigger the hidden wrongdoing, moreover, the more likely it seems that a court will find 
enough evidence of deception.  See, e.g., In re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) par. 99,817 (N.D. Cal., July 19, 2017). There the court agreed with plaintiffs that the 
company’s statements such as that reducing emissions was a top research and development priority and 





revealing that a material reason for the apparent success was the 
wrongdoing.117  In other words, something close to an well-crafted 
scheme to defraud.118    
No doubt there are reasons for the courts’ hesitancy, even if 
corporations have no Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  
Some reasons are better than others.  Possibly it is because any such 
mandatory disclosure seems almost futile, on the assumption that few 
issuers will actually reveal their secret criminality in a timely fashion even 
with the most explicit duty to disclose.  But that is not quite right, for 
there are many regulatory regimes that require self-reporting of illegal 
behavior with significant rates of compliance—in a well governed 
corporation, discovery of wrongdoing should lead to immediate efforts at 
remediation, not an inevitable cover-up.  And even if it does not actually 
generate disclosure because management directs a cover-up, a securities 
lawsuit at least allows compensation for those deceived, and potentially 
deters the underlying misconduct to the extent that an additional 
powerful sanction is added to the enforcement mix. 
A better reason for the heightened sensitivity here has to do with the 
inherent subjectivity of law.  Relatively few legal disaster cases are ones 
where there was absolutely no doubt about illegality; ordinarily, there 
would be contestable fact questions and legal defenses available to the 
company.  Most large corporate criminal and regulatory cases are 
resolved without adjudication, with insiders probably often believing that 
they would (or at least should) prevail at trial but unwilling to bear the 
costs and risks.  The disclosure obligation, moreover, comes at an earlier 
                                                 
117  See In re Van der Moolen Holding NV Sec. Litig, 405 F. Supp.2d 388, 400-01(S.D.N.Y. 
2005)(illegal trading revenues); In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp.3d 751, 760-61 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017)(statements about pricing for a particular product misleading for failure to disclose bribes).  For a 
case finding the potential for deception in both generalized stress on a commitment to safety and 
reliance on a particular metric that it tried to game even if the numbers might have been technically 
accurate, see In re Massey Energy Co. Sec. Litig., 883 F. Supp.2d 597 (S.D.W.V. 2012). 
118 See Lipton, supra, at 132 (“At that point, it is not so much the company’s statements, but its 
business model that acts as a fraud on shareholders”), citing cases in accord with this approach, 
including Strougo v. Barclays PLC, 312 F.R.D. 307, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). See also In re Countrywide 
Financial Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp.2d 1132, 1153-54(C.D. Cal. 2008).  At some point in cases like this, 
resort to “scheme liability” instead of the more common half-truth approach seems plausible.  E.g., 
West Virginia Pipe Trades Health & Welfare Fund v Medtronic Inc., 845 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 
2016)(allowing case involving pay-offs to doctors authorized by pharmaceutical company to proceed 
under scheme liability, thus obviating the need to focus entirely on the sequence of disclosures made by 
the issuer).  If followed elsewhere, Medtronic offers an interesting alternative to breathing life into the 





point in time, at which there is no concession of liability.  As with 
government investigations, disclosure isn’t terribly useful without a 
candid risk assessment, which could compromise the company’s ability to 
make or defend its case.  So the background norm for implicature should 
be the issuer’s strong desire to limit the risk of self-incrimination and not 
reveal weaknesses that might be exploited by regulators, prosecutors, 
competitors and the like.  Investors should not liberally draw inferences 
inconsistent with that desire, in other words, but instead understand that 
the issuer is trying to manage a potentially risky situation without 
prejudicing its defense.119  This is the one of the few areas in the world of 
voluntary disclosure where the cooperativeness principle is something of 
a misfit.  Beyond that, however, courts should stop mindlessly repeating 
the shibboleth that the securities laws are not meant to force disclosure of 
mismanagement or wrongdoing.120  If both material and genuinely the 
subject of deception, concealment claims about such matters deserve the 
courts’ careful attention.  
 
III.  NARRATING THE DISASTER 
 
A disaster often becomes public when announced by the corporation, 
while other times the news comes first from some other source (e.g., 
government prosecutors, financial media) or is so publicly visible that it 
needs no announcement.  In any event, the company is now in crisis and 
someone—or a team—will be expected to become the narrator and 
speak on its behalf, addressing the nature and scope of the event, why it 
happened, and most importantly, the consequences like to flow from it.  
They know full well that millions (or billions) of dollars in liability risk 
other consequences may depend on whether they are sufficiently candid 
yet desperately not wanting to add to the conflagration or upset their 
superiors by getting something wrong or disclosing too much.   
There are numerous instances of firms handling such situations badly 
enough that a court finds a triable issue of fraud.  In the BP Deepwater 
                                                 
119 See Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra. 
120 E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial 





Horizon case, for example, the judge determined that the company’s 
1000 barrel per day estimation of the “flow rate” of oil discharged into the 
Gulf of Mexico in the days following the disaster—though not necessarily 
implausible or in bad faith—could be misleading for failure to reveal 
higher estimates generated by other internal or external 
methodologies.121  Even though the Coast Guard and others were publicly 
suggesting that the actual amount might be five times higher, BP could 
have misled investors by projecting too much confidence in a figure it 
kept trying to defend.122  
Obviously, this is difficult terrain to travel.  Public relations experts 
usually advise firms in crisis to gain control of the story rather than let 
others frame it.  Many different stakeholders, not just investors, will be 
vitally interested in what is said, perhaps inclined toward anger, fear or 
panic.  The natural desire is project a sense of confidence and control, 
assuring others that the company and its management are on top of the 
situation.123  The truth may be otherwise, of course, which makes this 
phase so crucial in any fraud-on-the-market lawsuit.  Behind the scenes 
often lurk palpable uncertainty, fears about blame, and the challenges of 
getting an unruly high-level team “on the same page” under severe time 
pressure.  What is said may turn out to be unduly optimistic, thus 
becoming fodder for a lawsuit by purchasers who point to much more 
harm than was initially indicated.  Fear of liability may in turn cause the 
company to truncate its disclosures, raising the risk of half-truth 
accusations based on the misleading inadequacy of what was said.  Yet 
saying nothing is generally impracticable because the story has taken off 
(in social as well as conventional media), others may be spinning it in 
their own interests, and the risk of rumors and misinformation is 
abundant. 
                                                 
121 In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 2016 WL 3090779 (S.D. Tex. 2016).  The court was clearly influenced 
by the Supreme Court’s then-recent Omnicare decision as enlarging the scope of duty to disclose 
background facts that would alter the reasonable investor’s assessment of the degree of uncertainty and 
likely state of affairs.  It stressed the severe uncertainty under which all persons were acting, demanding 
“a bespoke pattern [to disclosure] rather than a blanket approach.”  Id. at *13.   
122  The court said that it arguably “doubled down” on its original 1000 bpd figure.  Id. at *14.  Later on 
the BP official expanded the range to somewhere between 1000 and 5000.  The court suggested that it 
should have stress the tentativeness of all the estimations rather than anchoring on a single point 
estimate, which then became difficult to let go of. 
123 E.g., Anastasya Zavyalova et al., Managing the Message: The Effect of Firm Actions and Industry Spillovers 





The law here is largely the same as what we have already covered.  
While there may be SEC filings required in the midst of the crisis, they 
are not likely to play as large a role.  Indeed, most lawyers will advise 
delaying the filing of a 10-K or Q if the situation is too fluid and uncertain 
to draft something in which everyone is confident.124 The disclosures are 
almost always legally “voluntary,” if not practically so, which makes the 
half-truth doctrine predominant once again.   
The background norms for implicature in a crisis setting are precisely 
the opposite of what the Supreme Court described in Omnicare, where it 
noted the diligence and deliberateness that goes into a filing 
accompanying a public offering (or any other SEC filing).  The company is 
reacting to a bad event, under great pressure, and cannot be held to quite 
the same heightened expectations as to candor or completeness.  The 
reasonable investor presumably understands that the truth is hard to 
extract from a crisis situation, so that inferences should not too liberally 
be drawn one way or the other from things deliberately not said or 
affirmatively avoided.  That said, at this stage we have may well have 
hyper-materiality—exceptionally intense trading and investor interest in 
what the company and others have to say, so that there must be a baseline 
of candor and completeness on which reliance is invited.  Courts are 
walking another fine line, and as in BP, the decisions here tend to reject 
narrations that are overly self-protective.125 
 
IV.  KNOWLEDGE AND INTENTIONALITY 
 
A.  Scienter and Corporate Awareness 
 
If what was concealed was a lack of preparedness for or some 
heightened risk of the disaster that came to pass, some person or persons 
                                                 
124 See SEC Rule 12b-25.   
125 The Fundao dam cases also had a narration aspect to them, as both joint venturers initially stated 
(falsely, according to the plaintiffs) that they were not in a position to be held derivatively liable for the 
environmental damage and misrepresented other consequences of the dam failure. See In re Vale S.A. 






in authority must have been aware of or ignored the propensity of what 
was said or omitted to mislead investors. This is because Rule 10b-5 
liability requires scienter—i.e., knowledge or recklessness.  Pleading and 
proving this is often heavy lifting for the plaintiffs’ lawyers, especially 
because courts tend to see recklessness not as a heightened form of 
negligence but rather something closer to willful ignorance or conscious 
disregard.126   
Disasters are often not easy to see coming until it is too late.127 There 
are structural, psychological and political (agency cost) reasons for this, 
which have been explored by many scholars in recent years, stimulated in 
particular by the global financial crisis effectively foreseen by almost no 
one.128  The structural reasons involve how information and responsibility 
are diffused in large organizations—“siloed,” to use a familiar term—so 
that the risk-related dots remain unconnected even as the situation turns 
dangerous.129  The psychological reasons relate to the difficulty human 
beings have in recognizing change—the so-called conservatism bias.130  
That is all the more problematic when managers (or corporate cultures) 
are overconfident or excessively optimistic,131 or motivated to deny or 
resist information that threatens their preferred interpretation of what is 
happening.  Internal politics can also distort information flow, where 
senders either bury key facts or put their own spin on them, either to 
make themselves look better or to cater to a superior who doesn’t want 
to know the whole truth.132 
                                                 
126 That is the most common definition, effectively requiring that the defendant be aware that he 
doesn’t know the truth yet speaks falsely as if he does.  See COX ET AL. supra, at 707-08.  At the 
pleading stage, there is a statutory requirement that the facts presented give rise to a strong inference of 
scienter.  Id. at 708-18. 
127  See Michael D. Watkins & Max H. Bazerman, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen 
Coming, Harv. Bus. Rev., March 2003, at 72; LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra, ch. 2. 
128  See Biljana Adebambo et al., Anticipating the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Who Knew What and When Did 
They Know It?, 50 J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 647 (2015). 
129 See Geoffrey Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazards: How Conceptual Biases in Complex 
Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 807 (2010). 
130  See Watkins & Bazerman, supra, at 76. 
131  For a recent survey of the literature, see Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Behavioral CEOs: The 
Role of Managerial Overconfidence, 29 J. Econ. Perspectives 37 (2015).  The connections between 
overconfidence and the etiology of corporate fraud are explored in Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, supra, 
at 35-42. 





This offers both opportunities and challenges for plaintiffs in disaster 
cases.133 As a legal matter, they have to plead and prove corporate scienter, 
the standards for which have puzzled the courts for decades.  Being legal 
fictions, corporations cannot act knowingly except to the extent 
knowledge is attributed to them as a matter of law via their officers, 
directors and agents.  But not all the knowledge of corporate officials is 
attributed to the firm, especially if it is scattered piecemeal among many 
different persons.  Courts want some more compelling connection 
between the knowledge and the misstatements,134 which is 
straightforward enough if there is evidence the person(s) who spoke on 
the company’s behalf knew enough about the truth so as to have acted 
with scienter.  But that is not a necessity, especially at the pleading 
stage.135  Courts seem to understand that besides just making things 
excessively hard for plaintiffs, too a narrow test generates an obvious 
incentive for executives to signal to subordinates that scienter-creating 
information is to be kept from them so as to reduce the risk of both 
personal and corporate liability. At the same time, an overly broad scope 
to attribution, on the other hand, starts looking more like strict liability 
for the issuer, which generates its own perverse incentives.136  Most 
courts are willing to expand the zone of attribution beyond complicit 
                                                 
133 Disaster cases pose the hindsight bias problem, derived from psychological research (and folk 
wisdom) that our thinking about the likelihood that an event would occur as of some prior point in time 
is inevitably biased by knowing that it in fact did occur.  This affects both materiality and scienter, to 
the extent that fact-finder either imagines erroneously that management must have known that 
something was amiss or overcorrects to absolve managers and the issuer for fear of imposing “liability 
by hindsight.  Both aspects of this problem are discussed extensively in G. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by 
Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773 (2004) 
134 E.g., In re Hertz Global Holdings Inc. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 1536223 at *23 (D.N.J. 2017)(“the 
pleaded facts must create a strong inference that someone whose intent could be imputed to the 
corporation acted with the requisite scienter”); Silvercreek Mgt Inc. v. Citigroup Inc., 2017 WL 
1207836 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)(“it is not enough to separately allege misstatements by some 
individuals and knowledge belonging to some others where there is no strong inference that, in fact, 
there was a connection between the two”). 
135  See Teamsters Local 445 Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008).  A 
corporation can be liable under an agency law approach when the executive makes the misstatement 
within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority.  See In re ChinaCast Educ. Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 809 F.3d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 2015).  In these kinds of cases, courts seem to assume that the 
speaker must have acted with scienter. 
136 As Jennifer Arlen has pointed out in her studies of corporate criminal liability, automatic corporate 
liability discourages good internal compliance, because such compliance increases the probability of 





actors only moderately, and here the doctrinal fog thickens.137  Many 
extend the list of those whose knowledge is attributable to include those 
who authorize the statement to be made even if they did not actually 
formulate it, or who furnish information necessary to its formulation.138  
The Sixth Circuit has recently taken this a step further, bringing onto the 
list any who reviewed the statement before or after its release and 
ratified, tolerated or recklessly disregarded the falsity.139  Other courts 
simply use status in the organization as the test.140  There is particular 
controversy over whether to allow plaintiffs to plead that information 
must have been known to those sufficiently high up for attribution 
purposes simply because it was so important that it surely would have 
been known to them.141  
 
B.  Awareness and Compliance Controls 
 
Whatever the particular attribution test applied, courts seem to want 
to see enough evidence that the false or misleading statement could fairly 
be described as intentional at the disclosure level.  That would not likely 
be so if the facts were bottled up somewhere in the firm and the senior 
management responsible for the disclosure was entirely unaware of them 
                                                 
137 This issue is explored thoroughly in Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate 
Scienter, 2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 81. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: 
Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1187, 1229-30 (2003). 
138  E.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004).  Many 
courts indicate that at the pleading stage, the standard is less strict than at trial.  Teamsters Local 445 
Pension Fund v. Dynex Cap. Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008).   
139  In re Omnicare Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 476 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Doshi v. General Cable 
Corp., 823 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 2016). 
140 E.g., Thomas v. Shiloh Industries, 2017 WL 2937620 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)(“In the closest 
approximation to a workable standard for determining corporate scienter, courts in this District have 
held that ‘management-level’ employees can serve as proxies for the corporation. . . .”)   
141  This idea was developed by Judge Posner in Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, 513 F.3d 702, 710 
(7th Cir. 2008), on remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in that case.  This is effectively a 
presumption of knowledge from the nature of the information and the inherent implausibility of it not 
being widely known among senior managers.  For some skepticism, see Plumbers Local 1200 Pension 
Fund v. Washington Post Co., 930 F. Supp.2d 222, 231 (D.D.C. 2013).  Although useful in some 
kinds of disaster cases, this “collective scienter” pleading aid is not necessarily all that useful for the 
kinds of disasters that are outside the normal course of business.  See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” 
Marketing Sales Practices Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 99,817 (N.D. Cal. 2017)(refusing 





(much less if no single person in the firm knew the troubling fact but 
could have had a diligent effort been made to gather all the facts diffused 
throughout the firm).  
High-quality compliance systems are supposed to address this. As to 
financial reporting specifically and disclosure generally, control systems 
are a legal requirement for public companies.  More far-ranging controls 
as to legal and regulatory compliance are at least a de facto necessity as 
well.142  A substantial body of learning and best practices has emerged in 
the last decades about what constitute good controls.  Not surprisingly, 
quite a few disaster cases contain allegations of breakdowns in internal 
compliance controls.  Because the CEO and CFO have to certify their 
oversight and an absence of known material deficiencies regarding 
financial reporting, plaintiffs sometimes argue that an undisclosed control 
failure constituted fraud.  That could certainly be true in some cases, but 
these kinds of arguments have not had much success where the 
breakdown cannot be described with particularity so that plaintiffs’ 
argument seems to be that the later disaster event by itself proves that a 
breakdown had occurred.143  On the other hand, highlighting a controls 
system can put the issue of adequacy in play, as where a company that 
handles toxic materials “discussed [its] pollution abatement equipment 
and its provision of monitoring environmental teams on duty 24 hours a 
day,” which the court found enough to potentially trigger a duty to 
disclose because what was said “gave comfort to investors that reasonably 
effective steps were being taken to comply with applicable environmental 
regulations.”144  These are just variations on the issues discussed earlier. 
                                                 
142 E.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Age of Compliance, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2075 
(2016). 
143 E.g., In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp.3d 731, 757-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)(citing cases).  
Even if this hurdle is jumped, plaintiffs must show that the breakdown was related to financial reporting 
(see In re Petrochina Co. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp.3d 340, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)) and—eventually—
that the breakdown had a sufficiently tight causal connection to the disaster event. 
144 Meyer v. Jinksolar Holdings Co., 761 F.3d 245, 251(2d Cir. 2014); see also In re City of Brockton 
Ret. System v. Avon Products Inc., 2014 WL 4832321 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 29, 2014); In re Scottish Re 
Group Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp.2d 370, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). To be sure, assessing internal controls is 
difficult, and would be especially so for plaintiffs at the time they file a complaint, preceding any 
discovery—the main point at which scienter assessments are made in fraud-on-the-market cases.  There 
can be some aid from the fact that external auditors are required to assess and report regarding material 
weaknesses in financial reporting controls at larger issuers.  And the larger the disaster the more likely 
it is that government agencies or the financial media will have done their own investigations on which 





Could a well-plead allegation of a known control deficiency in 
advance of a crisis also help with scienter?  Precisely because of the 
complex organizational nature of information flow, there can and should 
be some meaningful way of ascribing recklessness to the system itself for a 
failure to come to know, beyond whether those who did know were high 
enough up.  After all, corporations are distinct persons in the eyes of the 
law whose securities law liability is generally seen as primary, not merely 
derivative via respondeat superior.145  My impression is that a meaningful 
form of scienter can (and should) be available without the practical and 
doctrinal tangles associated with finding individual knowledge to 
attribute.  It would not be unreasonable or inconsistent with the 
heightened pleading standard to allow plaintiffs in their complaints to 
make a circumstantial case that the control failure that produced the 
absence of high-level knowledge was not readily explainable except by 
recklessness in the design or implementation of the control system. 
Consider a case where a parent company suffered financially as a result of 
disastrous wrongdoing at a major, recently-acquired subsidiary.  Plaintiffs 
are able to show that the parent’s internal control system was deliberately 
compromised with respect to the sub, because the sub’s powerful CEO 
would “go ballistic” at intrusions, thereby leading to a struggle to get 
acceptable information. In just such a case, the court stumbled on the 
meaning and nature of attribution as to the sub’s CEO, and dismissed the 
case.  But putting that attribution issue aside, the compliance failure itself 
should have been treated as an allegation of corporate recklessness that 
suffices at the pleading stage.146 
 
V. CAUSATION AND DAMAGES 
 
                                                 
145  See Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence, 90 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 933 (2013), criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus Capital Group Inc. v. 
First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), for employing an unrealistic view of the nature and 
limits of corporate personhood.   
146 For a case on essentially these facts that could well have been decided on this basis—but was not—
see Doshi v. General Cable Corp., 823 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 2016).  The court drew a distinction 
between attribution of knowledge and attribution of scienter, and found the former present but the 
latter lacking.  This is not a common distinction to draw: most courts simply equate knowledge and 
scienter, without looking for separate evidence as to the motivations behind the misrepresentation or 





A.  From Duty to Causation 
 
We now move on to the final cluster of disaster-related issues on 
which plaintiffs must sustain the burden of proof and persuasion: 
reliance,147 loss causation and actual loss (damages).  At first glance, it 
would appear that these are disconnected from the duty to disclose issues 
we’ve been examining, and should be relative easy to deal with.  By 
definition, a disaster brings with it an immediate and dramatic price 
decline upon disclosure of the truth.  That would seem to satisfy the 
standard of loss causation, which is a command that plaintiffs demonstrate 
some proximate link between the fraud and the loss so that the fraud-on-
the-market claim does not to become a de facto insurance scheme by 
compensating for price declines caused by other unrelated factors (e.g., 
extraneous market movements or supervening events).148  But as any law 
student who has finished first-year torts would see, this is a financial 
markets version of the Palsgraf problem, which is all about duty.149 
To illustrate: after surviving so much motion practice trying to 
dismiss plaintiffs’ “pre-spill” claims in the BP litigation, they failed at the 
class certification stage because of a causation/damages problem.150  The 
case illustrates a conundrum.  So many fraud cases like BP are, as we have 
seen, concealment allegations.  In other words, had the defendants told 
the truth about the risks, the market price would have been lower than 
what investors paid during the class period.151  That would seem to lead 
                                                 
147 Reliance is a class-wide inquiry invoking the presumption endorsed in Basic and Halliburton II.  See 
notes --- supra.  On lingering questions of what has to be demonstrated and by whom, see Sale & 
Thompson, supra, at 546-50. 
148  See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 811 (2009).  
As Fisch shows, loss causation takes on more work than it is able to handle, which has led to immense 
judicial confusion about what is necessary to be demonstrated, by whom, and why.   
149 Palsgraf, of course, was about negligence liability, not intentional torts.  Its relevance, however, has 
been recognized in fraud cases.  See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
150  Ludlow v. BP P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2015); see Lipton, supra, at 119-20. 
151 Actually, there is another interesting duty issue embedded in this, which has received relatively little 
attention from courts or commentators.  In those situations where the issuer would have been entitled 
to conceal the truth, the measure of distortion should be the difference between the price at the time of 
the fraud and the price that would have prevailed had the issuer taken that option, which may be small 
or non-existent.  To assume truth-telling as the counterfactual takes duty beyond what courts have said 
in 10b-5 cases.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Econometric Evidence and the Counterfactual Difficulty, 35 J. 





to an out of pocket damage measure that would give each investor the 
dollars per share representing the difference between the actual purchase 
price and the hypothetical “true” price.  Empirically, however, that is 
hard to construct.  As a result, plaintiffs tend to turn to the later stock 
price drop as approximating their real damages, which they adjust if there 
are demonstrably extraneous or supervening events to be subtracted.   
 The problem, according to both the district court and the Fifth 
Circuit, was that what was misrepresented was risk whereas plaintiffs 
were asking for a measure based on the historical certainty that the 
disaster did occur (the actual stock price drop).  That, the judges thought, 
would overcompensate them vis-à-vis the price distortion theory on 
which their claim rested.  In response, plaintiffs said that surely certain 
investors, upon knowing the truth about disaster preparedness at BP, 
would not have bought at all but instead put their money elsewhere.  To 
that the judges said that there was no way of knowing who or how many 
of the class members would fit in this category, and that this open 
question meant that plaintiffs’ theory and proof as to damages was not 
common to the entire class.  Hence, class certification failed.   
 The judges may be right in their assessment, though loss causation 
was probably not the correct label for their reasoning.  There was clearly 
proximate cause: the foreseeable materialization of precisely the risk that 
had been misrepresented. But the very nature of the fraud-on-the-market 
lawsuit is about price distortion, so that a strict out-of-pocket measure 
would seem to be the necessary corollary for those who want its reliance-
absolving grace bestowed upon them.  The mystery is why so many 
courts have indicated a willingness to offer a rescission-based remedy 
instead in these kinds of cases. That is a story for another time and 
place.152 
                                                 
152  The measure of recovery in a Rule 10b–5 action always has been confusing. Not coincidentally, it 
always has been an afterthought in Rule 10b–5 case law. Litigants seeking to establish the existence and 
then the elements of a private cause of action under Rule 10b–5 were content to leave the measure of 
recovery to be resolved another day. In almost all cases “another day” never came as cases settled 
without the need to precisely define the measure of recovery. In those cases where the courts have been 
forced to state a measure, they have provided a bewildering mix of standards, often using the same 
terms, but frequently giving them radically different interpretations and doing little to resolve the 
inconsistencies. For those cases that made it to the end, judges seemed more partial to providing rough 
justice than to establishing a clean theoretical formula for recovery.” Robert B. Thompson, ‘‘Simplicity 
and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery under Rule 10b–5, 51 Bus. Law 1177, 1179 (1996), quoted in Koch 





 Importantly, however, not every investor needs that grace.  
Today, more and more investors limit their purchases to companies that 
meet some threshold of social or environmental responsibility or 
otherwise pay close attention to environmental performance.153  And 
these are not usually the price-takers assumed in fraud-on-the-market 
theory but active investors making customized investment decisions.  
These become ideal “opt-out” plaintiffs willing to forego the presumption 
of reliance in return for the ability to gain the advantages—including an 
effort at rescission—that come from showing that their investment in the 
company’s stock would not have occurred at all but for the falsity.154  It is 
not hard to imagine socially-responsible investors, in particular, adjusting 
their strategies and procedures to bolster this potential.  Where actual 
reliance can be shown, there are many possibilities for improving the 
deterrence value of private securities litigation.155 
 
B.  Credibility and Gamesmanship 
 
In the aftermath of corrective disclosure in light of some disaster, 
the observable stock price drop often seems excessive in relation to the 
fundamental value of the news that has just been revealed.  A common 
assumption is that this additional drop reflects the loss of credibility from 
revealing the extent to which management showed itself willing and able 
to dissemble, leading to the inference that other aspects of corporate 
performance and prospects may also be unreliable—“collateral damage” 
from the corrective news. One prominent study estimates that as much as 
66% of a stock price decline in the aftermath of fraud is reputational.156  
So here we find another subtle connection between duty and causation. 
                                                 
153 Chitru S. Fernando et al., Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart 
Money, J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis (forthcoming, 2017); note --- supra. 
154 See David Webber, Shareholder Litigation without Class Actions, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 201 (2015).  The BP 
litigation had a substantial opt-out component.   
155  This is the heart of Ann Lipton’s proposal to revive reliance in mismanagement cases by redesigning 
the puffery doctrine, rethinking loss causation, affording “holder” claims and even creating a cause of 
action for to facilitate greater shareholder governance.  Lipton, supra, at 139-46. 
156 See Jonathan Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 581 
(2008).  This may oversimplify, since there are so many different ways news relating to a disaster and 





 There is a lively academic debate over whether the class of 
investors suing in a fraud-on-the-market class action should be able to 
recover for some or all of this collateral damage.157 It certainly is a 
foreseeable consequence of the revelation, so that if this is simply a loss 
causation problem addressable by reference to the “materialization of the 
risk” standard used by many courts,158 the case for recovery seems almost 
self-evident.  On the other hand, if we focus on the time of the purchase 
or sale, opponents argue that there is no distinctive deception about 
credibility independent of the fraud itself.  Without that, class members 
have not been fraudulently misled about management’s credibility—pre-
existing credibility has simply been abused in the course of the fraud.159  
They are in no different position from the longer-term investor who has 
held the stock for years, who suffers precisely the same collateral damage 
but has no right to recover.   
 Because of the widespread judicial confusion about causation and 
damages, this argument is hard to resolve. As noted above, I am averse to 
anything but a strict “out-of-pocket” measure of damages in fraud-on-the-
market cases, as well as to obsessing on corrective disclosure.  If fraud-
on-the-market is about remedying distortion, then the amount of 
distortion at the time of the fraud has to be the only appropriate measure 
of damages, which might seem to undercut the argument for including 
                                                                                                                              
of more intrusive regulation going forward, and thus a drag on profits.  Research in the aftermath of the 
Deepwater Horizon catastrophe show that other drilling companies suffered significant stock price 
drops, presumably because of factors common to everyone engaged in that newly more risky business.  
See Frank Heflin & Dana Wallace, The BP Oil Spill: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Environmental 
Disclosures, 44 J. Bus. Fin. & Acct. 337 (2017).  The decline affected firms with lower quality 
environmental disclosure more than those who had been more forthcoming. 
157  For discussions, compare Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Collateral Damage and Securities 
Litigation, 2009 Utah L. Rev. 717 and Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 
10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 63 Bus. Law. 163, 179-85 
(2007)(collateral damage should not be recoverable) with Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in 
Securities Litigation, 35 J. Corp. L. 169 (2009); Lipton, supra, at 122 (should be recoverable).  Cornell 
and Rutten, supra, tie their argument to the point discussed (and critiqued) extensively above: the 
absence of a per se duty to disclose wrongdoing or mismanagement.  209 Utah L. Rev. at 738-41. 
158 E.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005).  For a good explanation of 
this idea, see Jay Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation and Loss Causation: Toward a 
Corporate Finance Theory of Loss Causation, 59 Bus. Law. 1419, 1442 (2004). 
159  Black, supra, rightly notes that executive certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act do create an independent duty for senior managers to attest both to the accuracy of the financial 
disclosures and the adequacy of internal controls, subject to a knowledge qualifier.  Such certifications 
can be important in imposing liability, especially the liability of the officers in question, in 10-Ks and 






collateral harm.  But this approach actually offers an appealing middle-
ground solution. Our earlier discussion of credibility as a variable (and its 
potential to facilitate impression management) suggests that the prevailing 
level of trust in management’s candor operates as a multiplier.  Take two 
issuers with different marketplace assessments of credibility: company A’s 
management is viewed as truthful, while company B has lost investor 
trust. If we imagine both companies making similar factual 
announcements of hard-to-verify information, the price inflation for A 
will be higher than for B.  So if what is represented is untrue, the price 
distortion will be larger for A.  If so, then there is a portion of the price 
distortion at the time of the fraud that does reflect credibility, not just 
information, and the loss when the truth comes out is not just collateral 
damage.  Once again, reliance on the integrity of the market price—and 
on the processes that underlie price formation—is an entitlement granted 
to encourage socially valuable risk-taking by investors.   
  
VI. DISASTERS AND SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE 
 
There has been a growing effort through both public and private 
channels to increase the amount and quality of corporate disclosure 
relating to matters of environmental and social responsibility, under the 
heading of “sustainability” disclosures.160  Proponents for more disclosure 
see disasters great and small looming in the foreseeable future and want to 
give investors and other stakeholders early warning as to which companies 
are sensitive to and prepared for these risks and which are not.  The goal 
for some is to produce useful information, while others simply want to 
use disclosure mainly to pressure companies into more sensitivity and 
preparedness.  Not surprisingly, mandated sustainability disclosure is 
highly controversial.  It has had more traction in Europe than in the U.S., 
where regulatory efforts are apparently now on a politically-induced 
hiatus.  In the U.S., business interests have made a concerted effort to 
limit the SEC’s mandate to matters of financial materiality, but that is just 
part of the resistance.  In the current political climate, for example, one 
                                                 
160  See Ho, supra. In its 2016 Disclosure Reform release, the SEC requested comment on sustainability 





can imagine the ideological consequences associated with imposing a rule 
that issuers address the specific impacts of climate change among an 
audience that includes so many climate change deniers.  
 As we have already seen, the supposedly clean separation between 
the financial and the non-financial is an illusion.161  Even if we stick closely 
to financial materiality, there is ample research tying environmental, 
social and similar aspects of corporate behavior to stock market valuations 
and firm profitability.162  Sustainability risks are priced.  The hard 
question is what specific disclosures mandates would add value in a cost-
efficient manner, taking into account the many positive externalities 
associated with accurate disclosure along with the inevitable costs.163 That 
is the motivation behind the various non-government organization efforts 
to fill the void via voluntary disclosure frameworks that avoid (directly, at 
least) both the rigidity of formal administrative rule-making and political 
battles for agenda control.  In the U.S., the Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board (SASB) is well underway in an effort to craft disclosure 
standards for domestic companies tightly coupled to financial 
materiality.164  Companies could opt-in, thereby creating expectations 
about what and how they will reveal regarding sustainability metrics.  
This approach has a number of virtues: the system has to be appealing 
enough to issuers to generate a critical mass of adherents while 
presumably also satisfying key investor stakeholder groups, thereby 
gaining flexibility and cost-benefit discipline that the SEC itself might find 
difficult to find.   
 Our interest here is about disaster-related litigation, particularly 
class actions.  The discussion connected to this is about whether (and if so 
how much) fear of litigation “chills” voluntary sustainability disclosure. 
This is of interest to sustainability proponents in two conflicting respects.  
If there is such a chill, then the case for mandatory disclosure might seem 
more compelling.  On the other hand, if governmental sustainability 
                                                 
161 And as to the investors whose interests extend to sustainability mainly on ethical grounds, it is far 
from clear how or why these concerns should be banished entirely from the realm of securities 
regulation.  See Williams, supra. 
162 See Allen Ferrell et al., Socially Responsible Firms, 122 J. Fin. Econ. 585 (2015). 
163 See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1887 (2013).  On the cost-
benefit assessments of externalities as they relate to the agency’s “core mission,” see Alex Lee, Beyond 
Agency Core Mission, 68 Admin. L. Rev. 551 (2016). 
164 The SASB efforts in this direction are described in its comment letter to the SEC on disclosure 





mandates are either unlikely for political reasons or unwise as a matter of 
policy, the litigation threat might stand in the way of optimal disclosure 
via a SASB-like process.  This is a well-known conundrum.  Issuer 
adherence to mandatory disclosure standards varies based on the potency 
of public and private enforcement threats together with the perceived 
proprietary and reputational costs and benefits of either law-abidingness 
or defection.165 Voluntary disclosure involves a different calculus, because 
silence is a legitimate option.  For decades now, there has been a working 
assumption that the threat of investor litigation leads issuers to a less-
than-optimal disclosure policy, fearing the consequences if they make 
statements or projections that turn out badly.  That disserves investors to 
the extent that what would have been disclosed was valuable.  This was 
the impetus behind the safe harbor for forward-looking information, 
although the statutory product was overdone.    
 The litigation risks associated with sustainability disclosure can 
easily be over-estimated, especially if the risks being discussed are likely 
to emerge, if at all, only in the medium to long-term.  Materiality natural 
diminishes the longer the time horizon grows; the probability of any given 
future is less and the magnitude of the impact less, if only because it has to 
be discounted to present value.166  The only serious litigation risk is the 
disaster that occurs relatively soon after the disclosures.  Loss causation 
issues also come into play here, because of the difficulties connecting 
specific disclosures to stock prices losses far into the future.  So does 
scienter, in that knowing or reckless disregard is harder to show in times 
of mind-numbing normalcy rather than palpable foreboding.   
 But near-term disasters are not impossible, and of course as time 
goes by in a continuous disclosure environment, what was far off 
gradually becomes less so.  The remaining questions, not surprisingly, 
take us back to duty.  We have seen ample defendant-friendly case law, 
especially in treating as puffery aspirational statements as to the issuer’s 
commitment to safety, security and sustainability.  But our main takeaway 
was that these cases are not all that well thought through as a normative 
matter, and counter-balanced by many other cases finding potentially 
actionable fraud in other soft statements, especially when repeated or 
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made in response to heightened investor interest.  In both the Deepwater 
Horizon and Massey Energy litigation, plaintiffs pointed to the issuers’ 
voluntary sustainability reports as sources of actionable deception.167  As 
investor interest in this area grows, issuers can’t be very confident that 
the law will favor them when disaster ensues.  It might, but it’s a gamble 
that depends on how the judge they draw reacts to the particular 
wordplay.   
 Could these same liability fears undermine SASB’s efforts to gain 
traction?  Any voluntary statement within the approved frameworks 
would, of course, still be tested under Rule 10b-5.  This raises the 
question of whether an issuer’s voluntary commitment to the standards 
creates a reasonable expectation for investors that what is said will be 
fully responsive to those standards.168  My sense is that the answer should 
be symmetric, so that if a duty to disclose derives from an SEC line-item, 
as I think it is and should be, it should from a contractual commitment to 
privately-promulgated standards as well.  In other settings, it is clear 
enough that following industry standards, even when they have some 
regulatory imprimatur, cannot protect statements that otherwise have the 
propensity to mislead.169 
So compliance with SASB-like standards is a proper “duty” subject 
for fraud-on-the-market litigation.  And materiality as applied under Rule 
10b-5 is explicitly the baseline for its sustainability standards, so that 
element fits as well.  The combination of duty and materiality, in turn, 
means that some litigation threat remains. On the other hand, some 
lessening of that threat comes from standardization: using a common 
rubric with other similarly-situated issuers reduces the risk that comes 
from being unique in what is said.  Presumably, SASB could aid this by 
explicitly setting boundaries for reasonable investor expectations.  In 
                                                 
167 See In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 922 F. Supp.2d 600, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2013)(may have been 
misleading but scienter not adequately alleged because authorship of sustainability report not clear); In 
re Massey Energy Co. Sec. Litig., 883 F. Supp.2d 597, 615 (S.D.W.Va. 2012)(Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report contained possible omissions).  The statutory safe harbor for forward-looking 
information offers a cautionary lesson about even the most aggressive protections when judges sense 
deceit.  See pp. --- supra.   
168  This is similar to the issue of whether the MD&A creates a duty in Rule 10b-5 cases, on which the 
Supreme Court had been expected to rule.  See note --- supra. 
169 See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969)(adherence to generally accepted 
accounting principles does not eliminate possibility that financial statements were nonetheless 





outreach and guidance to the investor community, in other words, it 
could emphasize that the standards have been crafted carefully to balance 
investor demand for sustainability disclosure and peer comparability 
against the costs and risks associated with providing such information, so 
that adherence is not meant to put “in play” anything beyond the natural 
or explicit confines of the standards.  Too much protectionism, of course, 
will backfire by turning the disclosure into unreliable cheap talk.  A 
reasonable, moderate statement of what investors should and shouldn’t 
expect, however, might help assuage issuer fears enough to stimulate 
participation in the voluntary regime notwithstanding residual fears, so 
long as they see good market driven reasons to do so as well.  Adherence 
to the letter and spirit of high-quality voluntary sustainability disclosure is 
more likely to lessen the litigation risk than increase it. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Our inquiry into the etiology of corporate disasters sheds light on what 
is emerging as a major issue in corporate disclosure theory and practice.  
By this point it should be clear that the securities laws—and the fraud-on-
the-market lawsuit in particular—are not as effective as they could or 
should be at forcing either disclosure about or managerial attention to the 
emergent risks leading up to a corporate disaster. Via either 
gamesmanship or stone-cold silence, corporations can hide too much risk 
and wrongdoing.  In other words, there is something deeply unsatisfying 
about making potentially massive fraud-on-the-market liability turn on 
the wordplay underlying such small distinctions.   
So we are back to the point at which we started Section I: if an issuer 
has engaged in financially material wrongdoing but kept it hidden, the 
market has been deceived (and the stock price distorted) regardless of 
whether artful paltering about the issue crossed some fine line. Today, 
however, courts disavow that it is their right or responsibility to optimize 





SEC.170  Politics being what it is, the status quo will probably be with us 
for the foreseeable future, so that courts will continue to struggle and 
disagree about what to do in individual cases by asking and answering 
questions that shouldn’t be outcome-determinative, but are. The effort to 
promote stock price integrity deserves better than this.171 Ultimately, 
how courts decide disaster cases says much about what norms of candor 
companies have to follow in an increasingly complex and risky world, and 
whether investors and others can depend on insiders not to hide the dark 
clouds that are starting to appear on the internal radar screens when 
everything still seems sunny to those outside.   
  
 
                                                 
170 Prior to the late 1970s, the courts were more open to a partnership role in duty-creation (see 
Bauman, supra), which probably led the SEC to pay less attention to the design of the disclosure system 
as a whole than it should have.  Reg S-K and its doctrinal limitations are the legacy of that era. 
171  Paying more attention to scheme liability may be a way forward.  See note – supra.  But courts have 
been skeptical of scheme claims as backdoor ways of expanding the category of persons liable for fraud, 
a skepticism that has its own collateral damage to the extent it also truncates fresh approaches to duty. 
